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I. INTRODUCTION 
EVERY entrepreneur is vitally concerned with selling methods. Success depends upon sales. Sales depend upon desire for the 
product. Desire for most products, including life insurance, is not 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
• • Member of the Wisconsin Bar.-Ed. The basic research for this article was done 
by Mr. Hanson. Robert E. Dineen and Robert W. Ninneman of the Northwestern Mutual 
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inherent but is created by the efforts of the entrepreneur. In the case 
of life insurance, an effective job of creating the desire, i.e., of sell-
ing, is usually necessary to convince a prospective insurance buyer 
that over a long period he should allocate a significant portion of 
his income to the purchase of an intangible such as life insurance. 
In the constant effort to improve marketing methods in selling 
life insurance, there has been a tendency in recent years to place 
special emphasis on an investment theme. Many companies have 
been selling life insurance as an investment akin to stocks or bonds 
rather than as insurance as such. In the "affiuent society," even peo-
ple in modest circumstances wish to share in what seems to them to 
be irreversible, long-range appreciation in values which charac-
terizes the world of finance. Any sales message that promises them 
unwonted participation in the money-making activities of the 
community, while simultaneously discharging an obligation to 
their dependents, falls on receptive ears. A typical sales presenta-
tion of this kind may begin as follows: 
"My company is interested in entering into a business 
relationship with you that can be very profitable both for you 
and for my company. Life insurance is a part of the program, 
but I didn't come here to talk to you about that. Let's forget 
the life insurance and consider only the making of money. 
"This is a sample policy and here is a page of coupons. 
They are colored green to look like money because they ac-
tually represent money. You can clip them out just like bond 
coupons, and exchange them for cash. Better yet, these coupons 
can be left on deposit with the company, which guarantees to 
pay you not less than 3 1 /2 percent interest. With the miracle 
of compound interest working for you, you would then receive 
in twenty years $3,500, which is almost $1,000 in excess of the 
face value of the coupons. 
"Now let's come to the most significant part of the contract. 
You will share in every dollar the company earns. Not only do 
you receive the usual dividend arising from the participating 
business, but you also share in the profits generated by the 
nonparticipating business. Let me ask you this. If you were to 
invest $400 with complete safety, what would you consider a 
fair rate of return on your investment? [After receiving the 
typical response of five or six percent, the agent continues.] 
Naturally four to six percent would be excellent, but of course 
it would be taxable. However, last year our board of directors 
declared a profit-sharing bonus of 12.5 percent, and that was 
tax-free .... Not only is this return extraordinary, but it will 
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almost certainly increase for you. This contract is sold only to a 
limited number of charter members, who get in on the ground 
floor where they can help the company grow. As the company 
expands, the profits increase. Meanwhile, the number of 
charter policyholders decreases through deaths and lapses. 
Doesn't it figure that with a limited and decreasing number of 
charter members sharing in ever increasing earnings, your 
share should increase every year? 
"In the usual life insurance contract two things build 
equity for you-cash values and participating dividends. These 
charter-investment contracts have both of these ordinary 
sources of gain, but they add to them the guaranteed coupon 
accumulation plus profit-sharing in all of the company's busi-
ness. 
"Furthermore, if you apply your coupons, your profit-
sharing dividends, and your regular participating dividends 
to the reduction of premiums, in about ten years you reach a 
point where there will be no more costs. That is, the balance 
due on the premium payments is reduced to zero. In short, 
as the company's earnings continue to increase after that, the 
company will pay you to own the insurance policy. You have 
a good life insurance policy. You receive annual dividend 
checks. You pay no more premiums. How can you beat that?" 
How can one fail to be impressed? Insurance is included as a 
bonus in connection with a foolproof and lucrative investment. 
Here is an opportunity for the prospect to discharge his moral obli-
gation to provide insurance protection for his dependents, and 
yet share in the investment opportunities of an affiuent society. 
This seems a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to get in on the ground 
floor. For once the prospect will not be on the sidelines watching 
others make money; this time he will be one of the insiders. The 
sales pitch abbreviated here is made, and successfully made, many 
times each day. But the investment theme is not the only one used 
in the modern marketing of insurance. Other appeals may be 
added: 
"Now most insurance companies are paying less than they 
should when you die. You know, don't you, that your insur-
ance policy is in part a savings account, and that there are cash 
values in it, i.e., if you cash it in, you can get an amount of 
cash that keeps increasing year after year. Every insurance 
company is required by law to pay you this cash if you want to 
end your policy, or to lend the money to you if you want to 
keep your policy. The reason is that it is your money. Now 
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you would think that when you die, the insurance company 
would pay you the cash value of the policy as well as the in-
sured sum. After all, you are paying annual premiums for 
insurance protection, but the company is only paying you in 
insurance the difference between the face of the policy and the 
cash value. Now our policies are different. Not only do you 
get the face value of our policy, but if you die in the tenth 
year, or the fifteenth, or the twentieth, you will also get back 
your accumulated premiums. We don't think anything less is 
fair."1 
A. The Common Specialty Provisions 
I. Tontine policies, or more accurately semi-tontine policies, 
provide for the accumulation of dividends by the company for a 
specified period. When the period expires, those policyholders who 
have survived and have not .lapsed or surrendered their policies 
share in the accumulated fund, to the exclusion of those who have 
died or have lapsed. The foregoing hypothetical specialty policy 
did not contain a tontine feature. 
2. Profit-sharing policies are participating policies promising 
the policyholder not only a share in the surplus created by this 
particular class of policies, but also in surplus generated by some 
other classes. Typically, profit-sharing policies share in the surplus 
generated by the nonparticipating business, but occasionally they 
share in surplus created by a separate class of participating policies 
which are not profit-sharing. 
3. Charter policies are sold at the beginning of a company's 
career, and are issued with an assurance that they will be sold only 
to a limited number of persons or for a limited total amount. The 
charter policies themselves, or statements about the charter feature 
made in the sales presentation, represent that the charter policy-
holder will receive a special advantage not available to persons 
1 These sales talks are fictitious but have been constructed from ones actually in use 
and from a written sales presentation in our files prepared by a company for use by its 
agents. Except for its brevity, the presentations are not unrepresentative. Of course not 
every specialty policy has all of these features in one contract, but some have a good many. 
See Equitable Life &: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 310 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1962), for a case which 
throws light on the nature of the sales presentations often used. 
There are numerous variations on the themes adumbrated here. A well-known one 
used in Indiana goes (in part): "You have been nominated-If you are an influential 
citizen in your community, it is possible that you may someday be 'nominated' by some 
life insurance company .•.. An opportunity to make a fine return on your money-
perhaps ten or twenty times the ordinary rate of interest on any other type of investment 
or savings plan .••• " The use of the expression "nominated" bears the mark of genius. 
It is hard to imagine it failing to produce results. 
1963] SPECIALTY POLICIES 171 
holding later policies issued by the same company. Most often, the 
special advantage is a profit-sharing feature; such charter policies 
form a subclass of profit-sharing. policies. 
4. Coupon policies contain a series of coupons in combination 
with an insurance conttact. The coupons vary in their provisions, 
but typically they mature in successive years, entitling the policy-
holder to a specified sum in cash, or to various alternative benefits. 
Sometimes passbooks, resembling those in use by savings banks, 
are used instead of coupons. There seems to be little difference in 
principle between coupons and passbooks. 
5. The return of premium provision promises to pay to the 
beneficiary all of the premiums paid up to the time of the insured's 
death in addition to the face amount, if the insured dies within a 
specified period. This is merely a form of increasing term insurance. 
6. The return of cash value provision is closely analogous to the 
return of premium provision. It promises to pay to the beneficiary 
the cash value of the pG>licy instead of the amount of premiums paid 
in addition to the face amount, if death occurs within a specified 
period. It, too, is a form of increasing term insurance. 
7. The sight draft (immediate cash draft) provision is a feature 
which promises to pay the beneficiary a certain percentage of the 
face value of the policy if the insured dies within a specified period. 
Characteristically it is paid quickly, with virtually no formalities. 
It is merely a form of level term insurance. 
As one may see from the above list, the specialty policies now 
being sold, mostly by relatively small companies,2 consist basically of 
standard components of life insurance, such as ordinary life, pure 
endowments, and various forms of term insurance. For example, 
the coupon provision is actuarially an endowment, while the return 
of premium, return of cash value, and sight draft provisions, are 
forms of term insurance. They are founded upon sound actuarial 
methods, with reserves meeting minimum legal requirements. In 
opposing new insurance department regulations, some of these 
companies point to the orthodoxy of their policies. But by com-
bining the traditional components in new ways and using un-
2 Although one specialty policy company has assets of over $4 billion, with more than 
$10 billion of insurance in force, the vast -majority of specialty policy companies, number-
ing in excess of 200 as nearly as we can ascertain, operate on a much smaller scale. Most 
of them have less than $10 million in assets, thirty have less than $1 million, while one 
hundred have less than $5 million. Further, the overwhelming majority of these companies 
have less than $100 million of insurance in force, more than twenty-five have less than 
$10 million, and almost another fifty have less than $25 million. About half of these 
companies are less than ten years old. 
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orthodox and often misleading selling methods, that which is essen-
tially traditional insurance coverage appears to be something 
"special." While to the cognoscente the contract is merely a combi-
nation of usual components, the agents of the company may succeed 
in giving the average prospect quite a different impression. Com-
plaints filed with state insurance departments illustrate what the 
prospect is led to believe: 
"If we didn't draw out the dividends they would be so 
large we wouldn't have to work." 
"When the agents sold me these policies I was sold with 
the idea that they were stock as well as protection and that 
within ten years my return would exceed 400% and that I 
could draw out the premium money at any time." 
"We were told it was an investment, the life insurance 
policy just an incidental."3 
Characteristically the effect of the sales presentation of specialty 
policies is to give the prospect the impression that he is buying into 
a profit-making opportunity rather than merely purchasing insur-
ance. It is the possibility of deception rather than objection to the 
actuarial characteristics of specialty policies that has led several 
state insurance departments to promulgate rules regulating them. 
Thus the Missouri regulation expresses its concern for "References 
to a policy as being an 'investment,' 'investors', or 'profit-sharing' 
policy, or the use of similar designations in such a manner as to 
misrepresent the true nature of a life insurance policy . : ." or 
"references to any policy or contract in such a manner as to mis-
represent its true nature .... " 4 
The objective of this article is to explore the various specialty 
policies which are being used in American life insurance today, 
to ascertain what problems are created for the public by the use 
of such policies, and to ask whether they should be forbidden or 
regulated and, if the latter, in what ways regulation can best be 
worked out. We will examine first the reasons why life insurance 
companies issue specialty policies, next the public policy objectives 
that are of relevance to this subject, then the problems raised by 
each major kind of specialty in succession, and finally we will pre-
sent some general conclusions from the entire study. 
3 Excerpts from letters and statements attached to a circular letter issued by the Neb. 
Dep't of Ins., March 20, 1962. See also Stegman v. Professional &: Business Men's Life 
Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 744, 252 P.2d 1074 (1953). 
4 Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. XII-9, §§ 1, 2, Jan. 19, 1962. 
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WRITE SPECIALTY POLICIES 
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The life insurance business has long been extremely competi-
tive, not only in price but in other ways.5 But since life insurance 
is sold, not bought, the key factor in life insurance competition has 
been the agent. In the past, competition more frequently has led 
to an increase in agency commissions than to a decrease in the price 
to the policyholder, but in this century, and particularly since the 
Armstrong investigation, a larger part of the competitive struggle 
between insurance companies has tended to center either upon the 
initial premium, or upon the net cost to the policyholder. Hence, 
one of the reasons that many small companies give for issuing spe-
cialty policies is that they are allegedly unable to compete on the 
basis of initial premiums or net cost. For example, one spokesman 
for companies issuing specialty policies said: 
"For the smaller company to meet low-cost competition head-
on with the same plan always places them in a tough position. 
This should be avoided, if possible, by the use of unique plans 
which do not permit comparison with the low-cost Ordinary 
l.f 1· . "6 1 e po 1c1es .... 
In the attempt to compete in a market in which buyers are 
increasingly price-conscious, two general approaches have been 
employed, separately or in combination, in the preparation of 
specialty policies. First, many of the policies supplement orthodox 
insurance protection with investment features and other attrac-
tions in order to provide a maximum marketing appeal despite 
admittedly high costs. Second, various orthodox insurance cover-
ages are combined in such a way that the benefits vary greatly, and 
cost comparison with the more traditional policies becomes im-
possible. In either of these two ways, the specialty company may 
shift the competition from price to another basis. 
The endeavor to succeed in selling life insurance in a highly 
competitive market is laudable, even though it may sometimes lead 
to shabby practices. But that is only one of the more praiseworthy 
motives for the sale of specialty policies. Another motive is the 
5 For extensive discussions of the history of life insurance with indications of its 
competitive nature, see KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910 (1963); STAI.SON, 
MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE 264-68, 342-45, 485, 582, 609 (1942). 
o Comment made by Mr. Ritter, Assistant Secretary of the Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana, participating in a forum, 1957-1958 PRO-
CEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF AcruARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 52, 56. See also id., 366. 
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provision of a favorable climate for the sale and manipulation of 
stock, i.e., the sale of specialty policies is sometimes an aspect of a 
stock promotion. An article in the Chicago Tribune describes the 
modus operandi of such a scheme as used in Illinois: 
"When the first 'public' issue runs out, a second one is 
floated at a higher price, then a third at a still higher price if 
the market will bear it, and so on. 
"After a few such flotations, each at a higher price than its 
predecessor, a secondary market is likely to develop that is 
sufficiently strong to enable the 'founders,' if they wish, to 
unload their original stock at a profit of several hundred per-
cent. 
"At this stage the initial promoter or team of promoters, 
who of course are among the holders of founders' stock, may 
do just that and pull out of the organization to go elsewhere 
and do likewise. 
"When they do, they leave behind no broken laws but a 
lot of publicly held stock in an insurance company which, tho 
actually operating, has yet to earn-or demonstrate that it 
could ever earn-the accolades bestowed upon it in the course 
of the stock promotion . . . . 
"A promoter or team of promoters comes into town ... 
and sets about lining up a dignified name or two carrying 
weight locally on which to prop the projected company's 
reputation .... Nothing illegal is proposed or contemplated. 
A life insurance operation actually is organized and set in 
business. Those who are attracted into the organization as 
backers at the outset are issued founders' stock at a very low 
price a share, perhaps $1 or less. Then a second stock issue is 
brought out for sale to the public at a higher price. Nothing 
essentially is wrong with that. The 'founders,' who do the 
work of organizing' the business and theoretically take the 
greatest risk, probably deserve to acquire some equity at lower 
cost than the general public."7 
The sale of specialty insurance is resorted to in connection 
with the promotion because it is the quickest and surest way to 
put business on the books and to produce rapid increases in pre-
mium income, thus enhancing the likelihood of profitable stock 
flotation. Where the founders of a company are mainly interested 
7 Clark, New Illinois Law Hobbles Insurance Stock Promoter, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 
27, 1960, pt. IV, p. 7, cols. 3, 4. "rrJhere have been a number of new companies that have 
started with low priced stock, put what appeared to be a substantial amount of business 
on the books, manipulated the stock, and then cashed in quickly." Probe, Jan. 22, 1959. 
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in the promotion rather than in the insurance enterprise, they are 
likely to move from state to state, forming a chain of companies 
one after another. Some of the companies may live and some may 
die; which they do matters little to the promoters. 
There is no simple way to ascertain the extent to which specialty 
policies are issued in order to sell stocks. If there were adequate 
demonstration that the sale of specialty policies is crucial to such 
stock promotions, and that the unavailability of specialty policies 
would suffice to prevent speculative stock promotions, that might 
be reason enough to forbid the use of all specialty features. In the 
absence of such a demonstration, which cannot be made now, 
specialty policies must largely stand or fall of their own weight, 
not merely because they are or may be used in connection 
with questionable promotional schemes. Their utility in that con-
nection is certainly an argument for their prohibition, however. 
Control of stock promotion abuses must then be treated as a sep-
arate problem, outside the scope of this article.8 
The extent to which insurance companies issue specialty poli-
cies is uncertain and probably could not be ascertained even with 
great effort. However, investigation shows that out of almost 1500 
life insurance companies operating in the United States, approxi-
mately 200 issue policies containing one or more of the specialty 
features.0 Some of these companies are to be found in every 
state except New York, the greatest concentration, however, being 
in the South and Southwest. A few states in the Midwest also seem 
hospitable to specialty insurance. These companies constitute over 
8 The flotation of insurance stock issues is sometimes within the control of the Securi• 
ties and Exchange Commission, sometimes of the state securities commissioner, and some• 
times of the state insurance commissioner. The subject is too complex to be treated 
briefly in a footnote, but it is a subject that would repay careful exploration. 
o BES'I''s LIFE INS. REPORTS (1962 ed.). In supplying information to the publisher, some 
companies mentioned special features. Moreover, if a company in either its summary of 
operations or in its liability statement listed coupons or coupon accumulations, it was 
counted as a coupon policy-issuing company. Of course, some companies that issued 
coupon policies in the past but no longer do so, still have to report coupon accumulations 
in financial statements. Thus a number of companies may have been included which 
once were specialty companies but are no longer. With respect to profit-sharing policies, 
companies having profit sharing only in connection with pension plans were not counted. 
With respect to charter policies, the company was included if Best's reported it as issuing 
a policy with a name like "Founders,'' "Charter,'' etc. Some such policies may be mis-
named but the error is not likely to be significant. The authors also know from mis-
cellaneous sources that a number of companies issuing special policies did not show up 
in the above ways. There may also be other companies which provided no indication in 
Best's and were not otherwise known to the authors. Nor does Best's include the most 
recently formed companies. It is dear that the authors' lists are subject to a variety of 
errors, but they do not all work in the same direction, and most of them tend to lead to 
a conservative enumeration. 
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thirteen percent of the total number of life insurance companies 
(although by no means thirteen percent of the insurance written), 
and touch an appreciable portion of the insurance buying public. 
The fact that nearly thirty states have recently reacted to the use 
of specialty policies with some form of regulation is also some indi-
cation of their widespread use. 
It is difficult to state with certainty that small new companies 
must avoid direct price competition in order to survive. In a regime 
of free contract, this question does not often arise as a concern of 
the legislator, for one begins with the assumption that an entre-
preneur should be free to vary his product as he likes in order 
to compete effectively. Freedom of competition, freedom of con-
tract, and freedom of access of new entrepreneurs to the market 
are different aspects of a value which ranks high in our system. 
Whether a competitive judgment is wise is not generally a question 
for the law but for the entrepreneur himself. However, the present 
article will discuss weighty considerations which have been urged 
in favor of restriction or prohibition of specialty policies. No reli-
able judgment can be reached on the question of whether to reg-
ulate or prohibit until one studies the probable consequences of 
such action. One must ask whether direct price competition would 
really be fatal to small companies, as is often alleged. If it would 
be fatal, a desire to preserve free access to the market should lead 
the legislature to be cautious in instituting controls which would 
seriously handicap new companies; if it would not be fatal, it 
should be less reluctant to impose controls. The following para-
graphs deal briefly with this question. 
The net cost of an insurance policy depends upon three ele-
ments-the cost of mortality, the rate of return on invested assets, 
and the level of the expenses of the company. It is difficult to see 
why the small company should be at any competitive disadvantage 
with respect to mortality costs. Given equally careful underwrit-
ing, mortality experience should be essentially independent of the 
size of the company.10 
So far as return on investment is concerned, although an im-
portant part of the investment market is closed to the small com-
pany with relatively small amounts to invest, there is no reason to 
suppose that a well-managed investment program for a small com-
pany cannot net approximately the same return as that for a larger 
one.11 A more significant difference in the net cost of insurance 
10 See 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55. 
11 "These smaller COIQ.panies have historically earned a higher net return on their 
1963] SPECIALTY POLICIES 177 
policies has been said to arise from differences in operating ex-
penses. Thus one official of a large company pointed out that " ... 
the trend is more and more toward mechanization, and the larger 
companies are first to take advantage of this. Also, the smaller 
company generally pays higher commissions .... "12 But the ad-
vantage of mechanization is easy to overemphasize. Small com-
panies may be able to use service bureaus that provide mechanical 
or electronic devices for a rental fee.13 In addition to the advantage 
of utilizing mechanical means for the handling of office routine, 
the large company with a tried and proven product and an estab-
lished name is in an advantageous position in the competitive 
search for good agents. It is difficult to build a first-class agency 
force for a new and unknown small company. Some strong induce-
ments are said to be necessary, hence it is common to rely upon 
higher commissions and the issuance of specialty policies having 
great marketing appeal in order to counteract the advantages of the 
big well-established companies in seeking agents.14 The new small 
companies apparently are forced to accept somewhat less-qualified 
persons as agents than do the larger companies. They also generally 
limit their portfolio to a small number of attractive policies, confine 
preparatory instruction to the fundamentals, and then often pro-
vide the new agents with a "canned" sales talk for the one or two 
policies they will sell.15 
investments in the past. This has been a most helpful subsidy to their growth." Bensten, 
Small Companies-Lemons or Lemonade?, 1960 GENERAL PROCEEDINGS: AMERICAN LIFE 
CONVENTION 238, 242. "As to interest, can a smaller company make more selective invest-
ments and gain a higher interest rate? Probably not, but they might be able to equal that 
of a larger company." 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC 
PRACTICE 55. 
12 Ibid. A recent study of costs throws much light on this question. Owsley, Cost 
Factors in Life Company Management, The Insurance Field, Sept. 13, 1963, p. 24. 
13 "The Service Bureau Corporation ••• is equipped economically to provide special 
services of the type most Life companies need. Small companies which feel that they 
cannot afford IBM installations of their own would do well to investigate their use." 
Lindon G. Hughen, Comptroller of National Equity Life of Little Rock, Arkansas, as 
quoted in Leslie, Means and l\fethods of Expense Reduction in Smaller Companies, 
1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 64, 78. "Within 
••• [recent] years smaller companies have been finding good, efficient use for computers 
•••• (T]he use of service-bureau computers has given smaller companies which do not 
have sufficient volume a chance to profit from computers." "\'\Tilliam Smith, of International 
Business Machines Corporation, while participating in a forum, 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: 
CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 87, 91. "The automation of lower volume 
companies is well on the way to solution. ,ve are even led to hope that mass production 
of the smaller computers will lead to a cost basis for these machines that will give us 
comparable cost ratios with the largest computers." Bensten, supra note 11, at 240. 
14 Borchardt, Agency Contracts and Financing Plans, 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CON-
FERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 39. 
Hi Id. at 39-40. Borchardt goes on to say that "the nucleus of an excellent agency 
organization can be built up of such inexperienced men." Ibid. 
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It is not clear how far the advantages of size extend. It is easy 
to overemphasize the economies of scale, and we suspect there are 
also disadvantages to great size. The ten largest companies have a 
smaller percentage of the market now than they had in 1950.16 
In any case, the difficulties of starting a company have not been 
so substantial as to prevent the formation of many new ones; 
the number of legal reserve life insurance companies operating 
in the United States doubled during the 1950's, and not all of 
these new companies sold specialty policies.17 A more impor-
tant factor than size in the success of any company is the quality 
of management and other top personnel. Much of the inherent 
advantage of large size can be reduced by intelligent and econom-
ical operation of the beginning company, especially as manifested 
by the choice of an unsaturated market as a starting point. The 
large companies have no monopoly on either management or sales 
talent, and even in straight price competition small companies need 
not be left behind.11a Nor is price competition necessarily decisive. 
One life insurance executive feels that "price competition can be 
weak competition. Many of the best agents do not even carry a 
rate book. Salesmanship is still the key to real success in our busi-
ness ... and it is here that the younger companies have been lead-
ing the way."18 
Indeed, not only is it possible for a small company to compete 
without specialty policies, as is demonstrated by the success of many 
of them in so doing, but there is some doubt whether such policies 
contribute to the ultimate success of a new company.19 Dissatisfied 
policyholders will lead to lower persistency, which will detract from 
16 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1962, § 3, p. 1, col. 2. See also figures provided in [1963] 
LIFE INS. FAcr BOOK 18; 68 LIFE INS. COURANT 66 (April 1963); 56 LIFE INS, COURANT 56 
(April 1951). 
17 Our survey of Best's revealed many new small companies that apparently do not 
issue the specialty policies discussed in this paper. Moreover, there seem to be small com• 
panies that make it a point of pride to succeed while using only traditional forms. See 
also Transcript of Hearing, In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of a Proposed 
Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code 82 Oan, 1962). But see Brief for 
General Life Insurance Corporation in Opposition to Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 35. 
17a For example, the following are actual premiums for a nonparticipating ordinary 
life policy for $10,000, for a male, at age 35: 
New or small company # 1 $190.70 
New or small company # 2 $207.50 
New or small company # 3 $190.60 
New or small company # 4 $187.70 
The average premium of five large, well established stock companies is $191.20. 
18 See 1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55. 
19 See, e.g., Mr. Farrant, Vice-President and Actuary of British Pacific Life Ins. Co., 
1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 55-59. 
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the competitive position of the company. If the purchaser of a 
specialty contract is oversold and is disappointed, the company's 
public relations will grow weak as the policy grows older. More-
over, agents recruited to sell specialty policies are not inclined to 
stay with the company if it shifts to more conservative practices.20 
But whether or not the advantages of a specialty policy out-
weigh its disadvantages, many small companies treat the specialty 
policy as the key to success and insist upon trying it out. In the 
absence of persuasive considerations urging the regulation of spe-
cialty policies, the small company should be free to try whatever 
measures it thinks will improve its position. Freedom in the market-
place is still a value in our society which receives and should receive 
substantial weight. But it is not an absolute; it must be weighed 
against other relevant values which urge restriction upon freedom 
of contract. This leads to a consideration of the important values 
which are thought to be implicit in insurance law, and to which 
the law regulating specialty policies must adjust. 
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING 
REGULATION 
At the 1962 Annual Meeting of the National Association of Life 
Companies (NALC),21 attention was focused upon the increasing 
number of states regulating, or proposing to regulate, specialty 
policies. There were many expressions of protest that these regula-
tions were being used by the larger companies to exclude the 
20 "A specialty-type salesman, as a rule, is an individual who will drift from company 
to company." Raymond Strong, consulting actuary, participating in a forum, 1960-1961 
PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 59. William K. Robinson, con-
sulting actuary, said in another meeting of the same organization, "Whatever the circum-
stances arc, at some time in the company's future there must be a change to the orthodox 
plans of insurance. This may come as a very drastic change and affect the agency force 
to a great extent. Companies have done quite well selling a 'founders' contract but have 
found their men woefully untrained and completely inadequate when attempting to sell 
the orthodox plans. The result has been a very substantial drop in volume." 1956-1957 
PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 144. 
21 The National Association of Life Companies was originally organized in Atlanta, 
Georgia in January 1955, under the name "National Institute of Life Insurers." It con-
sisted of approximately one hundred southern life insurance companies. In February it 
changed its name and enlarged its membership to about 160 companies. One important 
reason for the formation of this association was to resist the anti-tontine bill sponsored 
by the National Association of Life Underwriters (NALtJ) and to defend the use of 
specialty policies by small companies. See note 46 infra. See the National Underwriter, 
Life Ed., Jan. 14, 1955, p. I, and Feb. 18, 1955, p. 14; Insurance Advocate, Jan. 15, 1955, 
p. 31, and Feb. 19, 1955, p. 26; United States Review, Jan. 15, 1955, p. 24; The Eastern 
Underwriter, Jan. 14, 1955, p. l; The Spectator, March 1955, p. 28. The NALU bill may 
be seen at two stages of maturity in Life Ass'n News, Nov. 1954, p. 147, and May 1955, 
p. 86. See note 46 infra for the final text. 
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smaller companies from the market. Ellis Arnall, Chairman of 
Coastal States Life Insurance Company and Chairman of the 
NALC, declared: 
"Little business in every field asks nothing of big government 
or big business except fair play. Little business, as represented 
by nearly 1,000 small, growing, vigorous life companies, asks 
nothing except the application of the same rules to them and 
their large competitors."22 
The meeting passed a resolution which admonished 
" ... NALC member companies to take cognizance of and pre-
pare to fight the 'stringent restrictions' which are being en-
acted by several states against certain special policies. The as-
sociation feels that these restrictions are prejudiced in favor of 
the larger companies and that it has an equal right to compete 
freely insofar as its conduct is not injurious to the public."28 
Joseph J. McCaffery, President of State Life of Montana, issued a 
call to battle: 
"[The association] has resisted the tidal wave of opposition 
[to specialty policies] .... [T]his encroachment on the right of 
free competition must be eradicated .... The determination of 
the boundaries of 'public interest' should be established by 
policyholder demands and not by departmental regulation 
made without consideration accorded to individual or group 
needs and desires for protection."24 
Whether there should be regulation or even prohibition of 
specialty policies, and if there should be regulation, what kind it 
should be, depends on the public policy objectives which our society 
decides are important and seeks to implement. It is necessary here 
to sketch briefly the principal objectives of insurance law applicable 
to this problem.25 
The most important public policy objective of insurance law is 
the preservation of the solidity of the insurance company. However, 
this objective has little importance in the present context, for the 
specialty policy offers no particular threat to solidity. In general, it 
is actuarially sound. A second important objective of insurance 
22 The National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 11, 1962, p. 15, col. 3. 
23 Id. at 21, col. I. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See generally Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary In-
quiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. R.Ev. 471 (1961). 
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regulation is, however, to ensure that in the relations between the 
policyholders and the insurance companies there will be reason-
ableness, equity and fairness. A good deal of insurance law and 
regulation consists of efforts to police the insurance transaction and 
the relationships created by it, mainly for the protection of the 
policyholder in these respects. This important objective justifies 
and explains a great deal of intervention in the insurance transac-
tion, and is relevant in any discussion of specialty policies. 
The foregoing goals or purposes of insurance law are related to 
the effective functioning of the insurance institution itself. Without 
solidity and cequum et bonum, or "purity of the market" as one 
might call the congeries of related goals mentioned above,26 the 
insurance institution does not perform its basic social function. But 
in addition, various general aims of our society impinge upon the 
insurance institution as (}Verriding goals. Some of them lead to 
more legal intervention in the insurance enterprise; some lead us 
to eschew intervention. Some of the objectives are related to our 
political values; some are social and economic; some are moral. The 
whole range of goals having impact on insurance law has been 
studied in detail elsewhere;27 here they are described only so far 
as is important for present purposes. 
A goal that operates to limit and restrict intervention is the 
goal of liberty, by which is meant the absence of governmental 
interference in private relationships and private transactions. In 
the field of contracts especially, private autonomy is a value that 
has been and should be given great weight in our society. It reflects 
an underlying judgment that a central bureaucracy cannot, in gen-
eral, make decisions which primarily affect only individuals as wisely 
as can the individuals themselves. Under the name "freedom of con-
tract" this value reached its zenith in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century as one aspect of the translation of the doctrines of 
economic liberalism into law. To a considerable extent, the value 
of freedom of contract even became imbedded in the Constitution 
as one facet of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
In this century, however, there has been a substantial reduction in 
the value accorded to freedom of contract. Its constitutional pro-
tection has all but disappeared. But even if it no longer has the 
status of a constitutionally protected right, it is still a factor of im-
portance in deciding whether to enact specific regulatory or pro-
2a There is no suitable expression for this related group of objectives; they have been 
designated collectively as <Equum et bonum, for want of a better term. Id. at 486. 
27 See Kimball, supra note 25. 
182 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
hibitory proposals. It is here asserted that freedom of contract is a 
value so weighty that there should be regulation or prohibition of 
a freely contracted agreement only after a persuasive case has been 
made for such intervention. This value creates a presumption 
against government intervention in the private autonomy of freely 
contracting parties. This is true even if the contract in question is a 
contract of adhesion, so long as the market is competitive in the 
sense that, although there is no practical possibility for an indi-
vidual policyholder to negotiate terms with an insurer, there is at 
least the opportunity for him to shop around in a market in which 
a variety of products is available. 
Another value of American society that sometimes puts restric-
tions upon the intervention by the legislature and the courts in 
the insurance business, but at other times demands it, is the value of 
freedom of access to the insurance market for new entrepreneurs. 
This is related to the freedom of the individual insurance company, 
once admitted to the market, to compete without artificial restric-
tions upon the market by monopolistic controls. But neither free-
dom of contract, nor freedom to enter the market, nor freedom 
from domination of the market by self-appointed private guard-
ians of the public weal is an absolute value. All are values only 
to the extent that they contribute to the welfare of the com-
munity. The justifications for a competitive economic system are 
(1) that it presumably produces higher quality and lower cost 
products than can be produced under any other and (2) that it 
provides a more congenial climate for political and social freedom 
(which come close to being absolute values). Control by govern-
ment is cumbersome, difficult, and of uncertain consequence, 
and should be engaged in only so far as its effects are demonstrably 
good. The regulator himself has no monopoly on wisdom, and the 
facts upon which he must act are seldom clear. However, it is im-
possible to oppose regulation or prohibition directed at the pre-
vention of fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading practices, 
particularly if the form of intervention is mild. Interference that 
merely assures policyholders the power to make an informed 
choice when they purchase insurance does not really decrease eco-
nomic freedom; in a real sense it enlarges it. Competition can work 
well only if the purchaser is "able and willing to discriminate be-
tween articles offered by different competitors .... "28 
28 PAITERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 246 (1927). In his 
special message to Congress on March 15, 1962, President Kennedy said: "Misleading, 
fraudulent or unhelpful practices . • • are clearly incompatible with the efficient and 
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One makes part of the case for intervention in life insurance 
by pointing to the complexity of the contract. The average buyer of 
life insurance is nearly helpless in considering the elaborate, techni-
cal, and varying policies available in the market. This helplessness 
is more evident when there is completely unrestrained freedom, be-
cause the life insurance contract, at best difficult to understand, can 
then appear in any number of variations.29 
The proponents of specialty life insurance policies have usually 
framed the issue as one of struggle between the old, giant, estab-
lished insurance companies and the new, small, imaginative com-
panies seeking to find a place in the market and to create a more 
competitive environment. The theoretical justification for free 
enterprise is that a competitive climate provides incentive to pro-
duce new and better products. If it is true that the regulation or 
prohibition of specialty policies is a weapon of established com-
panies, utilized to keep new companies out of the business and 
to parcel out the market, then of course there should be great 
reluctance to impose such regulation or prohibition. On the other 
hand, there is a mystique about the idea of competition which can 
be and is used in an effort to justify many questionable practices. 
At the present time, few uninterested persons could be found to 
proclaim the merits of competition altogether unrestrained by law. 
New entrepreneurs have no natural right to have access to the 
market on any terms they may choose. The basic right is the right 
of the policyholder and of society rather than of the entrepreneur. 
It is legitimate to place limits upon the competitive freedom of 
both new and old companies for good reasons, and the problem is 
only to determine what limits are desirable to impose. 
The question can best be formulated in these terms: Are the 
circumstances under which specialty policies are now issued in the 
American life insurance market such that the public interest would 
be served by regulation or prohibition of these policies, taking into 
consideration both the desirability of reasonableness, equity, fair-
ness, and transparency of the market on the one hand, and freedom 
equitable functioning of our free competitive economy." N.Y. Times, March 16, 1962, 
p. 16, col. 8. "[The consumer has the] right to be informed-to be protected against fraud-
ulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other practices, 
and to be given the facts he needs to make an informed choice." Id., col. 2. 
29 "It is hard enough for the layman to understand the workings of the life insurance 
contract. It is the duty of the insurance industry in the public interest to simplify the 
phraseology and provisions, not to add that which intends to confuse and complicate." 
Testimony of Arthur Gordon, of the International Union of Life Insurance Agents, Hear-
ing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 104 Gan. 1962). 
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of access to the market and freedom to contract without government 
intervention on the other? Are the dangers of deception in specialty 
policy marketing so substantial and so deleterious that freedom of 
entrepreneurs must be restricted to prevent the deception? If so, 
can effective methods of control be devised which do not limit 
freedom unnecessarily, or is prohibition the final solution? The 
answer will not necessarily be the same for each kind of specialty 
provision; the question must be answered separately for each set of 
circumstances. It seems quite conceivable, although perhaps not 
likely, that one solution would be best in New York and another 
in South Dakota, or that one answer would be justified in 1925 
while the circumstances of 1963 demand another. Certainly one 
answer may be appropriate for the tontine or the profit-sharing 
policy, and quite another for the return-of-premium provision. 
With this brief introduction to the public policy considera-
tions applicable in this field, let us proceed to a discussion of the 
specialties offered and of the problems each raises, dealing with 
some lightly and with some in detail. 
IV. ToNTINE POLICIES 
Speculative insurance is not a new invention. The tontine, or 
the semi-tontine, has been a feature of the American life insurance 
scene for nearly a century. It is an application to life insurance of a 
speculative device proposed by Lorenzo Tonti toward the end of 
the seventeenth century as a way to resuscitate the sagging finances 
of the French state. A fund was collected from lenders, and each 
year interest was paid on the loan. Subscribers were divided into age 
classes, each constituting a closed group, and each year the interest 
on the fund was divided among the surviving members of the class. 
The principal sum was never repaid, all obligations of the state 
ceasing upon the death of the last subscriber. The appeal was to 
the speculative instincts of the subscribers, for the longer-lived 
among them eventually realized very handsome incomes by receiv-
ing an ever-increasing share of the interest on the entire sum 
originally contributed by all subscribers of the class. On the other 
hand, the short-lived subscribers lost a great deal. The tontine was 
in use into the eighteenth century as a means of raising revenue for 
the military adventures of European states.80 
In the United States, tontine life insurance dates from 1868, 
when the Equitable introduced its "Tontine Dividend Life As-
so See 2 ENCYC. Soc. Ser. 70 (1930). 
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surance Policies."31 Basically the tontine was a standard participat-
ing policy, with the payment of dividends on the policy deferred for 
ten, fifteen, or twenty years. Those who died forfeited any interest 
in the dividends, though not in the face value of the policy; those 
who lapsed forfeited both dividends and the reserve. The accumu-
lated dividends and forfeitures for each class of policies were paid 
to those policyholders whose policies were still in force. There was 
no guarantee as to the amount of the "jackpot," but on the basis of 
estimates that two out of three policyholders would lapse, the pre-
dicted profit would be very substantial indeed. This original ton-
tine plan was soon modified into the semi-tontine, in which there 
was no forfeiture of reserve values upon lapse. The amount of the 
premium in excess of the amount allocated to expense, losses, and 
to the legal reserve of the policy was not distributed as an annual 
dividend, but constituted the source from which the tontine, or 
accumulated fund was built. As before, only the survivors whose 
policies were still in force shared in the accumulated dividends. 
The semi-tontine was known under various names, such as the 
"deferred dividend," "dividend endowment," "reserve dividend," 
"life rate endowment," or the "dividend investment" policy.32 
The success of the tontine or semi-tontine was phenomenal, 
most of the companies in the business using it. Riding on it, the 
Equitable advanced rapidly to first place. Those leading companies 
that declined to embrace the tontine slipped badly in relative rank. 
For example, measured by insurance in force, the Connecticut 
Mutual dropped from second in 1875 to fourteenth in 1905, while 
Mutual Benefit dropped from fourth to eighth.33 
Soon the abuses to which the semi-tontines were susceptible 
were revealed by the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly 
of the State of New York Appointed To Investigate the Affairs of 
Life Insurance Companies, better known as the Armstrong Com-
mittee. The fact that the policyholders, even if they did survive the 
tontine period, would not receive an amount even approaching 
their expectations became clearly evident. This was mainly the 
result of three factors. First, there was a decline in interest rates,34 
31 BULEY, THE EQUITABLE 27 (1959). The American Tontine Life and Savings Ins. Co. 
of N.Y. issued the tontine earlier in the same year, but the Equitable action was the 
significant beginning. Id. at 28. . 
82 See 1 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE 
INSURANCE 93-96 (1953); STAI.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 487-88. 
33 STAI.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, table B, at 798-801. 
84 Id. at 242; REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMIITEE OF THE SENATE AND AssEMBLY OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK .APPOINTED To INVESTIGATE THE AFFAlRS OF LIFE INSURANCE Co11r-
PANIES 427 (1906) [hereinafter cited as the ARMSTRONG REPORT]. 
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for which no blame can be attributed to the companies. Second, 
although agents made no binding promises as to the amounts that 
would ultimately be distributed to the policyholder, they made 
very confident predictions which were not borne out by events.85 
Third, the accumulated fund was easy prey for costly and sometimes 
dishonest business practices because "there was a relative lack of 
legal accountability for the funds thus accumulated, since they were 
beyond the legal reserve."86 Sometimes these large surpluses were 
neither properly accounted for nor allocated to the policyholders, 
but were squandered in extravagance and corruption. 
Charles Evans Hughes, later Governor of New York, presi-
dential candidate, and Chief Justice of the United States, served as 
legal counsel to the Armstrong Committee. He spoke to the crux 
of the problem when he said that "of all the reforms suggested by 
the Committee, nothing ... is more imperatively demanded than 
that the companies should be compelled to exhibit the results of 
their management by annual accounting," and that "there seems 
to be general agreement that the abuses which inevitably flow 
from the control of large accumulations, said to be held for policy 
holders but not the subject of any definite obligation, make this 
necessary."37 The requirement of an annual distribution of divi-
dends appeared to provide the solution by preventing the long-term 
accumulation of funds which in the past had, by reason of acces-
sibility and comparative lack of legal controls, constituted a finan-
cial resource available for many questionable practices. Further-
more, a required annual distribution would eliminate a prime 
source of misrepresentation and exaggeration, namely the specula-
tive idea that the policyholder would share an ever-increasing fund 
with an ever-decreasing number of persons. 
After the Armstrong Committee Report the New York Legisla-
ture wasted little time in enacting a statute, effective January I, 
1907, requiring an annual apportionment and distribution of divi-
dends to the policyholders.88 About one half of the states seem to 
have followed New York's lead by requiring annual apportionment 
and distribution of dividends.89 A few states by statute require dis-
85 Kimball, The Role of the Court in the Development of Insurance Law, 1957 WIS. 
L. REv. 520, 539; see ARMSTRONG REPORT 422-33. 
86 Kimball, supra note 35, at 539; ARMSTRONG REPORT 422-33. 
87 ARMSTRONG REPORT 429. 
38 This is now N.Y. INSURANCE CoDE § 216. 
39 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.360 (1949); TEXAS INS. CoDE, Art. 11.12 (1963); Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 206.13(1) (1957). 
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tribution no less often than every five years;40 a few states prohibit 
the tontine by departmental regulation.41 
After the wave of legislation which followed the Armstrong 
Committee's report, it was easy to suppose that the tontine policy 
was of little more than historical interest. It is probably true that it 
never died completely, but until recently it appears not to have 
been common after being discredited early in the century. Lately, 
however, the semi-tontine seems to have been resurgent,42 although 
it would be impossible to obtain quantitative data as to the number 
of such policies issued. A memorandum submitted in 1954 to the 
Laws and Legislation Committee of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners by the National Association of Life 
Underwriters stated that despite the various anti-tontine statutes 
"certain companies are becoming so adept at circumventing these 
laws that it has become necessary to enact some specific anti-tontine 
legislation."48 In the same year one insurance newspaper stated in 
an editorial that 
"there has been a considerable increase in the writing of ton-
tine policies in the south, the southwest and the southeast .... 
[A]n increasing number of companies, especially the newer 
and smaller ones, are managing to get a good start during their 
early years by specializing in the sale of tontine contracts." 
The editorial declared that "on the evidence it can no longer be 
doubted that tontine policies are definitely on the increase."44 
Lending strong support to the conclusions drawn in these sources 
is the fact that some departmental regulations· prohibiting tontine 
policies have been promulgated in recent years.45 Furthermore, in 
response to an anti-tontine bill sponsored by the National Associa-
tion of Life Underwriters,46 nearly a hundred small insurance 
companies formed an association which was later to become the 
40 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.14020 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1603 (1955). 
41 E.g., Ala. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Sept. 23, 1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, 
[1955] !Ns. DEPT. SERVICE [for] .ALABAMA 3; Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. 152A, Aug. 8, 1961; Ga. 
Dep't of Ins. Order, May 26, 1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, [1955] INS. 
DEP'T SER.VICE [for] GEORGIA 10. 
42 "This plan [semi-tontine], which most people supposed had passed out of existence, 
experienced a revival in 1955 in Texas and a few other states. It was also known as the 
'survivorship bonus' plan." R.n:GAL & MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 286 (4th 
ed. 1959). Another term is "Special Persistency Fund." Prospectus of Surety Life Insurance 
Company, March 15, 1960, p. 28. 
48 [1954] 2 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 290. 
44 The National Underwriter, Life Ed. (editorial comment), Oct. 29, 1954, p. 14, cols. 
1, 2, reproduced in [1955] l PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. II7. 
411 See note 41 supra. 
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National Association of Life Companies, the primary purpose of 
which was to defend against the further enactment of anti-tontine 
legislation.47 In reporting that Alabama had issued a formal direc-
tive prohibiting the sale of tontine and semi-tontine policies, one 
paper stated that about thirty companies had been issuing such 
policies.48 This evidence gives justification for assuming that ton-
tine type policies have been issued in recent years on a fairly ex-
tensive and increasing scale. 
Why has there been such a resurgence? The issuance of tontine 
and semi-tontine policies prior to the Armstrong expose showed 
that often the combination gambler and family man that resides in 
most of us responds favorably to a combination of life insurance 
with a speculative element. Even buyers who would never gamble 
46 One version of the bill is found in [1954] 2 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 291: 
SUGGESTED BILL OUTLAWING TONTINE, SEMI·TONTINE, OR "JACK·POT" POLICIES 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Insurance Code to the contrary, no life 
insurance policy other than Group Insurance shall hereafter be delivered in this State: 
"(l) Which does not constitute the entire contract between the parties and which does 
not provide in the contract the amount and manner of payment of benefits, and the con-
sideration therefor. 
"(2) Which contains a provision for the segregation of policyholders into mathematical 
groups and providing benefits for a surviving policyholder or policyholders of a group 
arising out of the death of another policyholder or policyholders of such group, or under 
any other similar plan. 
"(3) Which contains a provision providing benefits or values for surviving or contin• 
uing policyholders contingent upon the lapse or termination of other policyholders, 
whether by death or otherwise. 
"(4) Which contains a provision that on the death of anyone not specifically named 
therein, the owner or beneficiary of the policy shall receive the payment or granting of 
anything of value." 
NALU submitted a revised version to a later meeting of NAIC. [1955] 1 PROCEEDINGS 
. OF N.A.I.C. 116; Life Association News, May 1955, p. 86: 
SUGiESTED ANTI·TONTINE BILL 
"No life insurance company shall hereafter deliver in this state, as a part of or in 
combination with any insurance, endowment or annuity contract, any agreement or plan, 
additional to the rights, . dividends, and benefits arising out of any such insurance, en-
dowment, or annuity contract, which provides for the accumulation of profits over a 
period of years and for payment of all or any part of such accumulated profits only to 
members or policyholders of a designated group or class who continue as members or 
policyholders until the end of a specified period of years. Nor shall any such company 
deliver in this state any individual life insurance policy which provides that on the death 
of anyone [other than a beneficiary,] not specifically named therein, the owner or bene-
ficiary of the policy shall receive the payment or granting of anything of value." 
The words in brackets are in the Life Association News, but not in the NAIC Pro-
ceedings. They represent a modification proposed subsequent to submission to NAIC. 
47 See note 21 supra. The provisional head of this new organization, Claude H. Poin-
dexter of Coastal States Life Insurance, said that "the primary reason for organizing was 
as a defense against the efforts of the National Association of Underwriters to obtain 
legislation outlawing what it has referred to as tontine or semi-tontine policies." See 
National Underwriter, Life Ed., Jan. 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 4. 
48 National Underwriter, Sept. 30, 1955, p. 1, col. 2; Ala. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Sept. 23, 
1955, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, [1955] INS. DEP'T SERVICE [for] ALABAMA 3. 
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in more direct ways may find the speculative aspects of the tontine 
attractive. This lesson either has not been forgotten or has been 
relearned and has produced the modern development of the semi-
tontine policy as well as the other policies containing speculative 
features discussed in this article. 
A. Disadvantages of the Tontine 
Several objections have been urged to the issuance of the semi-
tontine policy. It has been denounced as a gambling contract, as 
especially susceptible to misrepresentation, and as leading to waste 
and graft. Each of these suggested objections will be discussed 
separately. 
I. Speculative Nature of the T ontine 
It has often been said that the tontine or semi-tontine is bad 
in itself-that it is a gambling contract and therefore should be 
made illegal, even if it could be kept under adequate control and 
even if no abuses were chargeable to it.49 This contention is based 
upon the fact that a larger return may be received than is justified 
by the premiums paid for the individual policy; i.e., the lucky 
policyholder who survives and does not lapse receives a return 
that is much larger than would be provided him by ordinary in-
surance. Conversely, the unlucky policyholder who dies early or 
who lapses loses part of the premium which he has paid. This is 
said to be gambling and properly forbidden by law irrespective of 
abuse. 
"The tontine principle thus clearly adds a gambling element 
to perfectly legitimate basic life insurance. The 'estimated' 
40 The semi-tontine policy is sometimes called the "crap-shooter" policy by its oppo-
nents. See Barr, Coupon and Special Contracts, [1961-1962] 2 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF 
ACTUARIES IN Punuc PRACTICE 42, 45. It has been bitterly and intemperately attacked by 
its opponents. The NALU recently said that "deferred dividends ... are not essential to 
and, in fact, are foreign to the basic life insurance operation, being used only to promote 
sales by tontine devices that promise highly attractive awards to a relatively few survivors 
at the expense of the many who cooperated in a risk adventure superimposed on their 
policies without relation either to the financial needs or policy of the company or to the 
general interest of all policyholders." National Underwriter, Life Ed., Sept. 9, 1955, pp. 1, 
16, col. 4. Prior to the tum of the century Jacob L. Greene, President of Connecticut 
Mutual Life, the most dedicated opponent of the tontine in its early days, said: "I be-
lieve that the Tontine feature is a complete perversion of the element of protection to the 
family which is the sole merit of life insurance and the only reason of its being ••.. " 
Papers Relating to Tontine Insurance, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., No. 8, p. 
3 (1887) as quoted in 1 BuLEY, op. cit. supra note 32, at 103. See generally the polemics 
connected with this controversy, to be found in, e.g., the cited collection and in works 
cited in STAL.SON, op. cit. supra note 5, notes to Ch. XXI. Stalson gives a summary of the 
arguments on both sides. Id. at 487-95. 
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jackpot becomes the glittering bait dangled before the prospect 
as an extra added inducement, and in the deceptive and mis-
leading estimates of the profits that are to make up the jackpot 
and of the termination rates that are to "sweeten" the share 
of each surviving policyholder therein, lie our legitimate ob-
jections and the hazard that threatens the good name of life 
insurance."50 
Let us look more closely at the nature of the tontine portion of 
the contract. It has a certain resemblance to a pure endowment. 
A person who does not need to insure himself against premature 
death, for whatever reason, but who does need to insure himself 
against too long life, might wish to procure a pure endowment 
policy which pays him only if he survives to the crucial date, or an 
annuity which terminates in any event upon his death. If his endow-
ment is combined with a life insurance feature, or if his annuity is 
for a number of payments certain, he will pay more than for a pure 
endowment or life annuity. The differences in these premiums are 
easily calculable on familiar assumptions as to interest rates and 
mortality, and are often very striking. It is difficult to see why any 
person who needs either a pure endowment or a life annuity, alone 
or in combination with life insurance, should be denied one based 
upon assumed grounds of public policy and the assertion that 
these are gambling contracts. It is difficult to see how the tontine is 
in any different position if one assumes that no abuses accompany 
its issuance. The purchaser of a tontine has in practical effect 
obtained, in combination with his life insurance, a pure endow-
ment in a participating mutual association. The exact amount he 
will receive depends on the experience of his class, but he will get 
protection of a certain nature which may be useful to him, and at 
a relatively low rate. If no abuses accompany the tontine policy, it 
seems not only innocuous, but may even be valuable under certain 
circumstances. In any case, there is no justification for prohibiting 
it because of its essential characteristics. A good deal of the polemic 
against the tontine misses the mark. 
The semi-tontine may be less innocuous. From one point of 
view, it is less speculative than the full tontine. Thus there is a 
forfeiture only of the policyholder's share of the deferred divi-
dends, and not of the reserve as well. But the theoretical justifica-
tion of the tontine is that, like a pure endowment, it provides a 
liO Walker, Those Tontines Are Back Again!, Life A. News, Sept. 1954, p. 54. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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large potential benefit for a low premium. This is especially true if 
the ordinary insurance benefit purchased represents only a small 
part of the total premium. The semi-tontine does that to a 
lesser extent. It is a hybrid contract, mainly ordinary insurance 
but partially a pure endowment. Basically it is traditional life in-
surance to appeal to the sober family man, yet it has a minor 
speculative element to appeal to the gambling instinct. It has less 
of the advantage of providing a cheap way to create a fund for old 
age than does the full tontine. Instead it is a high cost policy with 
certain added speculative possibilities to make it appealing. Of 
course, it, too, may well enough meet the needs of a small part of 
the insuring population, but that was not the intention of its devel-
opers. It was intended both in the nineteenth century and more 
recently to appeal to a wide range of insurance buyers. No effort 
is made to limit its sale to those people who may have some spe-
cial need for which it is well adapted. Its attraction is not its 
suitability for a special purpose, but rather its speculative nature. 
It seems to follow that the semi-tontine is more objectionable than 
the full tontine, primarily because it serves a useful purpose less 
frequently than does the full tontine. While the existence of a 
tontine element is not necessarily bad in a contract, and may even 
be useful, this combination of the tontine element with life in-
surance prevents either from performing adequately the task for 
which each is the suitable instrument. However, little more can be 
said in condemnation of even the semi-tontine, so far as speculative 
character is concerned, than that it has relatively little value in 
the market place. It can hardly be castigated as a "gambling" con-
tract without a gross distortion of the facts. It is not a bad contract, 
but rather a relatively useless contract. 
2. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation 
The second objection to the tontine is its susceptibility to 
misrepresentation. Attention was focused on this problem by an 
editorial comment appearing in the National Underwriter. 
"At the NALU meeting in Boston the objections made to the 
tontine contract were principally the way in which it is usually 
sold. It was contended that the tontine policy is almost in-
variably misrepresented. "51 
The assertion that the tontine is almost invariably misrepre-
sented cannot be accepted without further inquiry. But if it is 
51 See note 44 supra. 
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true, then it follows without argument that steps should be taken to 
control the misrepresentation, for good faith is even more necessary 
in insurance than it is in most commercial transactions. If a policy-
holder learns that he will receive only a small part of his expecta-
tions in a tontine policy, "he will believe that he has been over-
charged and cheated on every other policy he owns. He very likely 
will look upon all other life insurance as legalized robbery."52 If 
the public should develop a dislike and distrust for the institution 
of life insurance, it would perform its important role in our social 
life less adequately. 
When one looks at the tontine policy as actually used in this 
country, it becomes apparent why it is especially susceptible to 
misrepresentation. It is a hybrid. It is neither pure insurance nor 
pure endowment, but a combination of both, designed to couple 
the life insurance that most people need with the speculative ele-
ment that makes it attractive. The buyer considers that he is getting 
insurance, the need for which brought him into the market-the 
need to protect his family against the consequences of a premature 
death. The tontine policy is an expensive way to do this because the 
tontine aspect provides protection against excessive duration of life. 
Only an unusual agent, perceptive and honest and able successfully 
to communicate difficult concepts to ordinary people, could sell the 
tontine policy as it exists in the market and be sure that only those 
persons who need and want it will acquire it. Even if the semi-ton-
tine as well as the full tontine justifies its existence by providing an 
answer to certain special needs, it seems clear that there inevitably 
must be much misrepresentation in the sale of such policies. 
The tontine is especially susceptible to misrepresentation for 
three related reasons, all operating to a degree that makes mis-
representation substantially more likely than in the case of a more 
conservative type of life insurance policy. The first is that to the 
usual uncertainties of interest earnings, mortality experience, and 
actual expense is added still another that is even less predictable, 
the lapse rate. 
A first-year lapse rate of fifteen to seventeen percent, which 
would be quite normal, may easily be stated in such a way as to 
suggest an equally large annual lapse rate throughout the life of 
a group of policies, which would be highly unlikely. One opponent 
of tontine policies made this point in the following language: 
"In many cases, an actual first-year termination rate of, say, 
52 Walker, supra note 50, at 60. 
1963] SPECIALTY POLICIES 193 
17% may be cited to a prospect as the rate that very likely will 
be experienced during the entire tontine period specified in 
the policy being offered to him. However, if we assume that 
in a class of 1,000 policyholders, 17% of them will terminate 
each year for 19 years, then we will find that only 23 will share 
in the tontine distribution. Such a termination assumption 
has no factual basis in the known experience of any com-
pany."5s 
Since a heavy termination rate means a gain for the survivors, 
there is much temptation for the agent to exaggerate.54 Inasmuch 
as lapse means forfeiture and persistency results in a sharing in 
profits from lapses, there is a tendency for tontine policyholders to 
show a higher persistency rate than ordinary policyholders.' At 
least the argument has been made in favor of tontines at a meeting 
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that they 
encourage persistency.55 Surely it is deceptive to emphasize to a 
prospect that he will have the advantages of a high rate of termina-
tion if the tontine encourages a high rate of persistency. There is a 
misleading appeal to the perpetual optimism in human nature-
to the assumption by each person that he will be one of the fortu-
nate few and to assumed facts about lapses that are likely to be 
untrue. 
The second reason for the susceptibility of the tontine to mis-
representation is that the lack of the same degree of legal control 
over the deferred dividend funds as that which exists over the 
legal reserve makes it possible to use overconfident assumptions in 
predicting future developments. While the reserve must be com-
puted on the basis of conservative assumptions, no such require-
ments are even relevant for deferred dividends. The salesman is 
free to estimate the profits on deferred dividends on the basis of 
the most favorable dividend and market price history, using a 
period such as 1919-1938, for example.56 Moreover, it is easy to set 
up a profitable investment list on the basis of hindsight. The pos-
sibilities for misrepresentation seem clear enough, leading in 
extreme cases to what one opponent called a "fantastic" profit pro-
53 Id. at 60. 
Iii Id. at 54. 
55 Memorandum submitted by Herbert Graves and D. D. Murphy. See [1955] I 
PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 119. 
56 The proposal reproduced in Walker, supra note 50, at 55, assumes "a repetition of 
the dividend and market price history, 1919-1938, of the Special Contingency Fund Port-
folio of earning securities in each of the following 30 Basic Industries." (There follows a 
list of thirty leading corporations.) 
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jection.57 The extremes to which such exaggeration may go are 
found in a sales presentation that proclaimed, for a Twenty Pay 
Life Policy with a semi-tontine feature, that 
"based on a minimum of $26.00 per unit of $5,000 being an-
nually contributed to the reserve fund as provided for in the 
special resolution by the board of directors, in twenty years 
your share of this distribution of profit would be a cash set-
tlement of $5,137.15."58 
The above proposal assumes that a $26 annual allocation to the 
tontine fund, or $520 in all, will mushroom to $5,137 ·within 
twenty years. The sales interview even suggested that this was 
ultraconservative. A staff member of the Kentucky Insurance De-
partment is said to have estimated, however, on the basis of the 
first five years of experience with this fund, that it would in fact 
be worth between $700 and $900 to those who survived and did 
not lapse.59 It must be pointed out, however, that the first five 
years would not necessarily be representative, and that the ulti-
mate results might possibly be better. 
A former president of the National Association of Life Under-
writers, a vigorous opponent of the tontine, provides another illus-
tration. 60 He focused upon a Twenty Pay Life Policy for $5,000. 
At age ten the annual premium was $165.65. After twenty years, 
the total of premiums paid would be $3,313, at which time the 
guaranteed cash value would be $1,770. The estimated value 
of annual cash dividends left with the company was stated at 
$331.30, and the estimated value of the tontine fund dividend was 
$8,656.16. The total, $10,757.46, was 324 percent of the total 
premium paid and more than twice the face of the policy. 
He then compared this with a $5,000 Twenty Pay Life, En-
dowment at age eighty-five, without a tontine feature. As sold 
by a "representative nonparticipating company" the latter policy 
cost $105.15 annually at age ten, and had a cash value of $1,775 
at the end of the twentieth year. 
"It is abundantly clear that the company issuing the semi-
tontine policy is putting no more into reserves and guaranteed 
non-forfeiture values despite the fact that it collects $1,210.00 
more in premiums over 20 years to maturity."61 
57 Id. at 60. 
58 Horan, Gimmick Policies, Best's Life News, June 1962, p. 65. 
59 Id. at 66. 
60 Walker, supra note 50, at 55, 58. 
61 Id. at 58, 60. 
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For the reasons discussed above, the excessive charge is not theo-
retically objectionable if it all goes into the tontine fund. However, 
in no tontine policy or proposal that the NALU president exam-
ined did the "issuing company propose to set aside in the tontine 
fund as much as one-half of the excess of the larger premium 
charged over the full tontine period."62 The confident projections 
seem to contemplate such a total allocation, however. If in fact 
substantial sums are diverted from the premiums to some purposes 
other than those stated to the policyholder, it would not be surpris-
ing if "the actual results fell so very far short of the rosy picture 
of dividend bonuses painted for policyholders that many of them 
actually felt they had been swindled."63 
The third reason that the tontine is often misrepresented is 
that there is little that can be done by the law to ensure that the 
entire excess is actually allocated to the fund. These extra dollars 
are largely in the control of the board of directors, and the policy-
holders have no precise contractual rights. In the heyday of the 
tontine, this was the great vice; funds for which there was such 
limited accountability were subject to extravagant practices and 
graft. There is no way to reach valid conclusions about the extent 
to which wasteful practices exist today, but there is at least some 
evidence that they are not unknown. Indeed, it would be surpris-
ing if there were not substantial abuses. 
3. Danger of Venality 
Extravagance and graft are themselves objectionable, quite 
aside from the fact that they lead to misrepresentation. Indeed, 
they led to the abolition of the tontine policy in many states in the 
early twentieth century. 
When a life insurance company operating on the legal reserve 
basis makes a promise to pay a specified sum of money upon the 
death of the policyholder, it is required by law to maintain reserves 
which are adequate as computed on a sound actuarial basis, to pro-
vide the funds with which to pay the beneficiary when the death 
occurs. The tontine aspect of the policy is different, however. No 
specified sum must be paid. There is only the promise that the 
policyholder will share in the proceeds of a fund the exact amount 
of which is completely uncertain, made at a time when it is even 
uncertain how much money will be paid into it year by year. The 
62 Id. at 60. 
OS United States Rev., June 12, 1954 (editorial comment), reproduced in (1955) 1 
PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 117, 118. 
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deferment of dividends that is involved in the sale of the tontine 
leads to the acquisition by the insurance company of large sums 
of money for which there is only limited accountability. The ab-
sence of close legal control over the funds encourages misuse 
through wasteful expenditures and through outright graft and 
corruption. Both kinds of misuse occurred in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, eventually leading to the Armstrong in-
vestigation. For one thing, the large sums of money held in deferred 
dividend accounts encouraged companies to engage in a commis-
sion war in which the rates of commission for agents continually 
grew as the companies tried to outbid each other for the better 
salesmen. Commissions tended to become uneconomically high, 
leading in turn to rebating and its discriminatory consequences. 
Second, the large sums of money available without strict legal 
accountability encouraged the payment of unjustifiably high sal-
aries and the use of other company funds to "buy" legislators and 
to make other improper and corrupt expenditures.64 A repetition 
of the more extreme forms of these abuses of the Gilded Age seems 
unlikely. But there is no assurance that some such practices would 
not be resumed. Even today dishonesty in public and business life, 
while less prevalent, is by no means unknown. 
This lack of accountability is not necessarily inherent in the 
ton tine. Joseph B. Maclean, actuary of the Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York, neatly put it: 
"The main defect of the system as formerly practiced was 
not inherent but arose from the fact that no accounting was 
required of the funds which were being accumulated to pay 
deferred dividends. . . . [Thus] it was the lack of proper ac-
counting which was wrong, rather than any fundamental de-
fect of the system itself."65 
The graft and corruption which were associated with the ton-
tine prior to the Armstrong investigation resulted from inadequate 
laws, not from the nature of the tontine. However, there is little 
likelihood that a satisfactory regulatory system for tontine policies 
will be developed, since they are now, and probably will remain, 
a minor aspect of the life insurance market. 
64 1 BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 193-244 (1953); JAMES, THE ME'Ill.OPOU-
TAN LIFE 139-65 (1947); 1 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 140-68 (1951). See generally 
.ARMSTRONG COMMITTEE REcoRD: TESTIMONY, EXHIBITS, REPORT (1905). A good contem• 
porary muckraking account was HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE (1907). 
65 MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 166 (9th ed. 1962). (Emphasis added.) 
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B. Asserted Justifications for the Tontine 
In defense of the semi-tontine policy, it is sometimes urged that 
the deferred dividend is nothing more than a terminal or surrender 
dividend of the type that is regularly issued by many large com-
panies. 66 A surrender dividend represents a contribution to surplus 
out of premium to ensure the solidity of the operation. It is re-
turned to the policyholder upon termination in order to produce 
as much equity as possible among the policyholders. The terminal 
dividend recognizes that surplus arises out of policyholder con-
tributions and should be shared as evenly as possible.67 This is in 
a sense the converse of the deferred dividend idea, where the ter-
minating policies forfeit all their interest in the deferred dividend 
fund. 68 Another suggested justification for the semi-tontine is that 
many large companies got a start by issuing it in the late nineteenth 
century.00 There is much truth here, but it is a non sequitur to 
conclude that the semi-tontine should therefore be legal. Many a 
large and now respectable family fortune had its origin in acts of 
corruption and exploitation; many a great and now respectable 
company was in its origin little more than organized brigandage. 
But at least in some respects the moral level of our society has 
improved, and the fact that some reputable companies have a 
blemished past does not justify new companies in similar repre-
hensible practices. What was yesterday only morally wrong may 
today also be illegal; if it is not yet illegal, perhaps it should be-
come so. 
It is urged as a related argument that the past use of specialty 
policies by companies which are now large was a competitive neces-
sity, and that a similar practice by small companies is today also a 
competitive necessity.70 It is some answer to that assertion that many 
companies, both large and small, seem to get along without this 
use. Of course, considerable value is properly placed in our society 
on free access to the market by new entrepreneurs. But short of 
imperative necessity, access should be upon terms now regarded as 
the basis for moral and legitimate operation of the enterprise. 
Maclean pointed out other advantages to the tontine. He sug-
66 See, e.g., National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 5, 1955, p. 3, col. 1, and Sept. 30, 
1955, p. 12, col. I. 
67 Surrender dividends are explained in McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 303-05 (1959). See 
also MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 167-68. 
68 National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 5, 1955, p. 3., col. I. 
60 Id., Jan. 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 4. 
70 Memorandum submitted to the Laws and Legislation Committee of the NAIC 
by Herbert Graves and D. D. Murphy. [1955] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 119. 
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gested that a year might be too short a period for a company to 
ascertain its profits and losses in a business heavily dependent upon 
the maintenance of reliable and predictable results over long 
periods.71 However, in Maclean's own analysis this is not crucial: 
"The amount to be distributed as dividends in any year will 
not necessarily or usually be the actual surplus earnings of 
the previous year. When current surplus earnings are not 
sufficient to maintain the scale of dividends, they may be 
supplemented by drawing on the existing surplus. In the same 
way, when surplus earnings are more than sufficient to main-
tain the existing scale, part of the current year's earnings may 
be added to surplus. When fluctuation in surplus earnings 
are small, this is a practical system of avoiding frequent small 
changes in the dividend scale .... "72 
Maclean also suggests as an advantage of the deferred dividend sys-
tem, the reduction of the strain on surplus caused by paying divi-
dends in the early policy years before any surplus had been cre-
ated. 78 
In summary, the tontine does not seem to be inherently evil as 
a gambling contract, but it does seem to be especially susceptible 
to misrepresentation and, absent the development of some new 
regulatory patterns, there is serious danger of misuse of the funds 
for which there is only limited accountability. There is substantial 
justification for control. 
C. Methods of Control of the Tontine 
The disadvantages in the issuance of the tontine policy are 
serious and require steps to combat them. Restriction of the ton-
tine to its proper sphere is one possibility. This would require, on 
the one hand, the development of a new set of legal controls to 
prevent the misuse of the funds held for deferred dividends and, 
on the other, the effective prevention of misrepresentation. The 
most obvious step to take to curb misrepresentation is to proscribe 
it and prosecute violators. But misrepresentation is a difficult of-
fense to detect and to prove, and consumer protection through the 
processes of the criminal law is at best a weak reed.74 More effective 
devices seem necessary if it is important to stop the misrepresenta-
tion. 
71 MACLEAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at 166. 
12 Id. at 149-50 (8th ed. 1957). 
78 Id. at 166 (9th ed. 1962). 
74 On this subject, see Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 
61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 141 (1961). 
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Prohibition of the tontine would be the most certain means of 
overcoming the disadvantages it offers. This has indeed been the 
normal approach to the tontine whenever there has been an at-
tempt at legal control. However, prohibition raises a serious prob-
lem of regulatory policy. Freedom of contract is an important value 
in our legal system.75 It rests upon the assumption that no govern-
ment agency is wise enough to make all contractual decisions for 
the population-to pass judgment on the social value of all trans-
actions. This is wise as a general policy, and particularly if the 
contract in question offers real advantages of which the public 
would otherwise be deprived. 
In this case, however, most of the advantages can be obtained 
by the buyer without using the objectionable contract, by combin-
ing, in any proportion the buyer desires or needs, term or ordinary 
insurance with annuities or endowment insurance. Only if the 
buyer wants a "pure endowment" might there be a gap in the 
market, for such a contract is seldom sold. It is revealing that 
McGill thinks the reason for the absence of the pure endowment 
from the market is that "few individuals are willing to take the 
chance of . . . forfeiting the entire consideration paid for the con-
tract. "76 Yet a great many find attractions in the tontine policy, 
which provides part of the same element. It is not possible to say 
that there would be no loss whatever to the market if the tontine 
were prohibited, but it seems clear that the loss would not be very 
great. 
Though a clear case must be made for the prohibition of any 
contract, the opponents of the tontine seem to have made a per-
suasive case for its abolition, and to have discharged the burden of 
proof. The tontine has serious defects, and it makes relatively little 
contribution to the market. To prohibit it seems justified if the 
dangers it presents cannot be eliminated with facility in any other 
way. 
Controls for the tontine other than outright prohibition would 
be difficult to devise. Although it is not now likely, it is possible 
for the deferred dividend fund to be subjected to legal control as 
stringent as that applicable to reserve funds. However, the main 
danger of the tontine is not that it facilitates misuse of funds, but 
that it often is the subject of serious misrepresentation. There are 
already sweeping laws on the books directed against misrepresenta-
75 See Kimball, supra note 25. 
76 McGILL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 70. 
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tion by agents. Perhaps a statute which would compel all statements 
made respecting anticipated dividends to be in writing would go 
some distance toward the solution of the misrepresentation prob-
lem, if it were rigorously enforced. The prohibition of certain rep-
resentations might help. An Illinois regulation, for example, pro-
hibits any statement that a company makes a profit as a result of 
policy lapses or surrenders.77 However, in the end these techniques 
of control probably would founder on the same difficulties that 
generally afflict regulation of misrepresentation. Inadequacy of staff, 
the difficulty of obtaining testimony, and the lack of official aware-
ness of violation except in a very small percentage of the cases, all 
combine to make the problem almost insoluble. It seems to follow 
that the tontine can be controlled effectively only by prohibition. 
If it is bad enough it should be prohibited. If it is not bad enough 
to prohibit, then of course it should be controlled so far as is pos-
sible, but there should be recognition from the outset that success 
is likely to be meager. 
Freedom of competition or of access to the market is also a 
value in a democratic society. But this is not a value that justifies 
access to the market at the expense of accepted moral standards of 
the community relating to business practice. It is not an argument 
that should lead us to refrain from prohibition. 
It follows from the arguments presented here that the tontine 
in all its variants should be prohibited. Statutes that require an 
annual apportionment and distribution of dividends seem to meet 
this need. Apportionment alone may be enough if there is no for-
feiture on lapse or death thereafter. 
A tontine-like element sometimes shows up in other contracts 
such as the charter policy, which is considered next. However, a 
minor and fortuitous "tontine" element in a contract is not alone 
enough to condemn it, for the dangers of the tontine lie not in its 
nature but in its abuse. Consequently there should be prohibition 
only where the danger of abuse is substantial. Only when the ton-
tine element is significant and tends to encourage misrepresenta-
tion or misuse of funds should it be abolished by legal fiat. 
V. PROFIT-SHARING AND CHARTER POLICIES 
All mutual insurance companies, and many stock companies, 
issue participating policies which promise to the policyholders a 
share in the surplus (sometimes miscalled profits) generated by the 
77 Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 5(22), Oct. 31, 1962. 
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participating business. The company apportions to each policy-
holder as a dividend, usually annually, that part of the divisible 
surplus that arises from the participating business, to the extent 
that it was contributed by him. In short, the dividend is essentially 
a return, calculated as equitably as possible, of the amount the 
company charged the policyholder in excess of the real cost of his 
insurance. A profit-sharing policy goes a step farther than a par-
ticipating policy in providing for participation in "profits" be-
yond the excess sum contributed by the profit-sharing policyholder 
himself. For example, it may contain a clause providing that the 
policy "will share in the profits of the Company to the extent ap-
portioned to it by the Company."78 This vague language does not 
limit the distribution to the surplus produced by the profit-sharing 
business. The company may contemplate inclusion of at least a 
portion of the surplus from the nonparticipating business as well. 
In the example given here, the promise is not explicit and the 
policyholder may have no clearly defined enforceable legal rights. 
This is one of the objections which can be made to some profit-
sharing policies although it is not necessarily inherent in this type 
of policy.79 
A. 0 bjections to Profit-Sharing Policies 
There are two main objections, other than indefiniteness, to 
the profit-sharing feature. First, its opponents argue that it is 
particularly susceptible to misrepresentation. Second, they urge 
that it violates universal explicit statutory prohibitions of dis-
crimination between policyholders of the same age and character-
istics. 
I. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation 
Any insurance policy is subject to possible misrepresentation, 
but many persons have urged that the profit-sharing feature is 
especially susceptible, and even that the use of the term is itself 
misleading. For example, the Florida Insurance Department has 
said that "the words profit sharing on a policy are misleading 
78 This is an exact quotation from a policy in our files. Later policies issued by the 
same company used the word "surplus" in place of the word "profits." 
70 For example, another company's profit-sharing policy was much more specific in 
setting out policyholders' rights. It provided that "the company guarantees that, during 
any year in which Planned Expansion Policies are in force with premiums payable in the 
amount of $100,000.00 or more, no dividends will be paid to stockholders of the Company 
unless dividends are paid on Planned Expansion Profit Sharing policies in a total amount 
equal to IO% of one year's premium paid on such dividends during such year, or 10% 
of dividends paid to stockholders in such year, whichever amount is greater." Prospectus 
of National Western Life Ins. Co., Jan. 9, 1963, p. 12. 
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to the public, and lend themselves to misrepresentation."80 The 
first part of the Florida statement is not necessarily true. The policy 
may actually be a profit-sharing contract, in which case there is 
nothing misleading about the appellation. Of course, if profit-
-sharing is promised but not provided there is deception, but that 
results not from the use of the words for an appropriate situation 
but from their misuse in an inappropriate situation. Any words 
can be misused in this way. In the discussion that follows, it is 
assumed that the policy is in fact a profit-sharing policy, and it is 
asked whether the profit-sharing aspect of the policy lends itself 
especially to distortion of the information which an agent normally 
provides a policyholder. 
Companies selling specialty policies frequently prepare 
"canned" sales presentations, expecting that they will be memo-
rized by their agents and used verbatim. One such presentation 
instructs the agent to ask the prospect: 
"If you were to invest $400.00 or any amount, with complete 
safety, and with no time or effort on your part, what would you 
consider a fair rate of return on your money?" 
The agent then is instructed to await an answer. It is anticipated 
that the reply will range from four to six percent. Upon receiving 
an answer, the agent is instructed to say: 
"Four to six percent would be excellent and of course would 
also be taxable .... The growth ( of our company) ... has been 
phenomenal .... This was so far beyond the expectation of 
our board of directors that they declared ... a surplus sharing 
bonus which amounted to 12.4 percent return and that was 
tax free." 81 
The purpose of these statements is to characterize the policy as an 
extraordinary investment because of the profit-sharing feature, 
while the attractiveness is further enhanced by the assertion of 
freedom from taxation. 
If the surplus sharing bonus is in fact a sharing of profits derived 
from other classes of policyholders, then it is a good return on the 
policyholder's investment. The first possibility for deception is, how-
ever, that most of the return to the policyholder may be in the nature 
of an ordinary participating dividend rather than a share of profit. 
80 Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 22, Aug. 8, 1961, as reprinted in WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, 
(1961] INs. DEP'T SERVICE [for] FLORIDA 15. 
81 These quotations are copied exactly from a sales presentation in our files. The pre• 
mium in this instance was $410.40, and the dividend was $50.90, or 12.4%. 
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In one such case, the return is alleged to have consisted in large part 
of (I) a refund of an excess mortality charge of about sixty-five per-
cent of the expected mortality cost, (2) a refund of about twenty 
percent of the loading, and (3) an interest credit of approximately 
one percent of the policy reserve at the beginning of the year.82 
Thus, all of the surplus bonus was simply a refund of overcharge, 
i.e., it was an ordinary participating dividend and did not represent 
profits at all.83 It is possible that there may be companies issuing 
profit-sharing policies and allocating profits to the profit-sharing 
policyholders in an amount as substantial as twelve to fifteen per-
cent. This would depend upon considerable success of the company 
in selling nonparticipating policies or policies that participate only 
after a certain sum has been allocated to the benefit of profit-sharing 
policyholders. We do not assert that no company ever plays fair 
with its profit-sharing policyholders, but rather that deception is so 
easy and profitable that it need not even be intended. The above 
statement that 12.4 percent of the policyholder's investment, i.e., of 
the initial premium, was returned to him during the preceding year 
could be (I) a statement that the profits allocated to the profit-shar-
ing policyholders amounted to a 12.4 percent return on their pre-
miums, which would make it a profitable investment, or (2) an 
assertion that 12.4 percent of the premium was returned as a par-
ticipating dividend, or (3) any intermediate combination of the 
two. Since these policies are participating policies, it is almost 
certain that in all cases some portion-perhaps a very substantial 
portion-of the return to the policyholders represents a participat-
ing dividend rather than profits in the true sense. 84 It would be 
a rare agent who would not describe the facts in the way most 
advantageous to his company and to himself. The probability of 
misrepresentation and misunderstanding in the case of the profit-
sharing policy is extremely high. Returns to the policyholder that 
82 Reply Brief for Wis. Ass'n of Life Underwriters and Wis. Life Convention, pp. 25-26, 
for Hearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08 (Jan. 1962). This 
assertion does not appear to have been denied by the company in the documents filed 
with the Wisconsin Department of Insurance. 
83 Reply Brief for G. L. Ins. Co., at 13, in the hearing mentioned in note 82 supra. 
84 One company recently issued a "President's expansion plan" which was a Twenty 
Payment Life Plan containing coupons and "special participation" features. This is a 
charter policy within our definition. When the company announced a dividend of about 
10% to its policyholders, the chairman of the board said: "This is indicative of the success 
of this life insurance policy with its special investment feature ...• " But for the year the 
dividend was declared the company had an operating loss of over $100,000. The 10% 
dividend can hardly have been a profit at all; instead it must have been a return of 
premiums. See BEST'S LIFE INSURANCE REPo&TS 2023-24 (1962 ed.); Insurance Advocate, 
Nov. 3, 1962, p. 70. 
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are in reality returns of premium paid are made to appear to be 
returns on the premium, i.e., profits.85 The emphasis on investment 
and a high rate of return tends to mislead the purchaser into 
believing that he is acquiring primarily an investment rather than 
a life insurance policy. The market success of some life insurance 
stocks prepares the way for even more striking deceptions, and 
some sales presentations are so successful that they convince the 
purchaser that he is acquiring stock in the company.86 
Although it is by no means impossible that a transaction will 
satisfy the expectations of the profit-sharing policyholder, as one 
would expect from the distortion in the typical sales presentation, 
"experience ... [has] indicated that purchasers of such contracts 
were more often than not disappointed."87 
Two characteristics of the business lead to the almost inevitable 
disappointment of the profit-sharing policyholders. The first results 
from the competitive position of nonparticipating policies. Agents 
selling participating policies are able to emphasize in their sales 
talks that gross premiums less dividends will produce a lower net 
cost than in nonparticipating policies despite an initially higher 
premium.88 In order to remain competitive, nonparticipating pre-
miums must be kept as low as possible. Thus, price competition 
limits drastically the nonparticipating surplus available for dis-
tribution to profit-sharing policyholders. 
The second characteristic of the business that lessens the pos-
sibility of the profit-sharing policyholder reaping "tremendous 
profits" is that ultimate control of the conduct of the business lies, 
not with the profit-sharing policyholders, but with the stockholders 
and with a management representing them. A stock insurance com-
85 The Wisconsin Insurance Department issued Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wisconsin Ad-
ministrative Code on May 4, 1962, which said, in describing the profit-sharing policy, 
that "such policy forms are so drafted that it appears to a prospective policyholder that 
he is purchasing a preferential share of the future profit and earnings of the insurance 
corporation rather than purchasing a life insurance policy which may be subject to refund 
of excess premium payments." 
86 "[F]or every dollar this company ever earns, you as a ... [profit-sharing policy-
holder] will get a piece of that dollar." (From a sales presentation in our files.) The 
Indiana Insurance Commissioner stated, in a circular dated June 3, 1959, that "other data 
[used in sales presentations] indicates how insurance stocks have grown in market value, 
leaving the inference that if the prospect buys one of these 'profit sharing' contracts, he 
too is in for making a fortune-the 'chance of a lifetime' they are told. The prospect 
is again being misled." 
87 Statement of California Insurance Commissioner, J. of Commerce, March 7, 1960, 
p. 9, col. I. 
88 Three-fourths of all ordinary life insurance in force in the United States is par-
ticipating insurance, attesting the success of this approach. Beith, Participating Life 
Insurance-The Stock Company Version, 29 J. INS. 229, 231 (1962). 
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pany is not an eleemosynary institution, but rather it exists to earn 
money for the stockholders. If discretion is left to each company 
to decide how much to allocate to profit-sharing policyholders, 
there is no reason to assume that the board of directors will be any 
more generous than appears to be necessary. Even if the profit-
sharing policyholders have more precisely defined rights than in 
our original example, 89 the extent to which there are profits to be 
divided may be subject to some control by the way in which the 
business is operated. The amount may be reduced by selling one 
kind of policy rather than another, and there is every reason to 
expect management to take such considerations into account in 
its management practices. 
Indeed, when contractual rights permit, it is not unknown for 
the stockholders, through the management, to make an effort to 
claim even a portion of the profits generated by the participating 
business. This is suggested by the existence in five states of statutes 
or regulations placing ceilings on the amount of profits that stock-
holders may take from the participating business. Illinois requires 
that at least ninety percent of the profits on participating business 
be allocated to the benefit of the participating policyholders.90 Wis-
consin and New York permit the company to distribute to its 
stockholders the larger of two amounts, (a) ten percent of the 
profits on participating policies, and (b) fifty cents per year per 
thousand dollars of participating life insurance.91 New Jersey uses 
the fifty cents per year per thousand limitation.92 Nebraska is the 
most restrictive of all the states; it requires that all surplus gen-
erated by the participating business accrue to the benefit of the 
participating policyholders.93 
89 See note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
90 " ••• no life company authorized to do business in this State shall issue both par-
ticipating and non-participating policies unless at least ninety per centum of the profits 
on its participating policies shall inure to the benefit of the participating policyholders." 
ILL. INS, CODE § 233 (1961). 
91 " ••• no profits on participating policies and contracts in excess of the larger of 
(a) IO per cent of such profits, or (b) fifty cents per year per thousand dollars of par-
ticipating life insurance ... in force at the end of the year, shall inure to the benefit 
of the stockholders .••. " N.Y. INs. CODE § 216(6)(b). WIS. ADM. CoDE section Ins. 2.02(4)(a) 
(1962) sets out similar limitations. 
92 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:34-12 (1962). 
113 "All domestic stock life insurance companies, which shall hereafter issue both par-
ticipating and nonparticipating policies, shall hold all the surplus and earnings arising 
from the participating insurance for the benefit of and for distribution to the participat-
ing policyholders •••. " NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-708 (1960). In Canada, a sliding scale ap-
plies. The stockholders' participation is limited to 10% of profits when the profit fund 
does not exceed $250 million, to 7½% between $250 and $500 million, to 5% from 
$500 million to $1 billion, and 2½% above $1 billion. The Canadian and British Insur-
ance Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT., c. 31, § 84 (1952). 
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2. Violation of Statutory Prohibitions Against Discrimination 
The second principal objection to the profit-sharing policy is 
that it violates explicit statutory prohibitions, most of them being 
concerned with discrimination. Section 3(£) of the Uniform Un-
fair Trade Practices Act94 makes it an unfair trade practice to 
"issue . . . stock . . . or securities or any special or advisory 
board or other contracts of any kind promising returns and 
profits as an inducement to insurance .... " 
Section 3 (g) makes it an unfair practice to 
"make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of 
individuals between those of the same class and equal ex-
pectation of life in the rates charged for contracts of insurance 
or of life annuity or in the dividends or other benefits payable 
thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of the 
contracts it makes ... [ or to] discriminate unfairly between 
other risks involving essentially the same hazards and expense 
elements or between risks in the application of like rates and 
credits." 
Section 3(h)(l) prohibits rebates or 
"any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other ben-
efits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement not 
specified in the policy contract of insurance." 
However, section 3(h)(2) states that 
"Nothing in this or the preceding subsection [the anti-dis-
crimination and rebate provisions] shall be so construed as to 
prohibit any company issuing non-participating life insurance 
from paying bonuses to policyholders or otherwise abating 
their premiums in whole or in part out of surplus accumulated 
from non-participating insurance .... " 
94 Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Under• 
writers Ass'n, insurance was deemed to be commerce. Consequently it would be within 
the scope of federal control under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958) and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958). Congress then enacted Public Law 15 (Ferguson-
McCarran Act), 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958), which preserved the 
rights of the states to regulate insurance with the proviso that "after June 30, 1948 the 
Sherman Act, .•. the Clayton Act ... [and] the Federal Trade Commission Act shall 
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated 
by state law." Prompted by the last phrase, in order to preserve state control, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners undertook studies which culminated in the Model 
Unfair Trade Practices Act. For reports, proposals, and other information, see PROCEEDINGS 
OF N.A.I.C. passim (1947). For proposed bills, see id. at 392-410; 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE 
199-254 (5th ed. 1952). See also Kimball & Jackson, supra note 74, at 143-44 (1961). All the 
states have in substance enacted this model act. [1960] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF N.A.I.C. 150. 
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As enacted in some states, for example in New Jersey, the last 
quoted subsection has contained an important added qualification: 
"[P]rovided, that any such bonuses or abatement of premiums 
shall be fair and equitable to policyholders and for the best 
interests of the company and its policyholders .... "911 
The limiting provision in section 3(h)(2) does not apply to section 
3(£); its range of application is explicitly limited to sections 3(g) 
and 3(h)(l). 
Our basic problem is whether profit-sharing policies are legal 
or whether they are forbidden by the statutes quoted above. There 
are two separate questions. The first is whether section 3(h)(2) 
precludes the application of section 3(g), which in the absence of 
section 3(h)(2) would surely prohibit profit-sharing policies as dis-
criminatory. The second is whether section 3(£), which is un-
qualified by section 3(h)(2), forbids these policies. We shall con-
sider these two questions separately. 
First, does section 3(h)(2) preclude the application of section 
3(g)? Read literally, it seems to authorize the payment of bonuses 
out of the surplus from nonparticipating business without any spe-
cial limitation of the way in which the bonus must be allocated; i.e., 
it seems on its face to insulate such bonus payments from any 
requirement of equitable and fair allocation. The nature of non-
participating business tends to strengthen this position. By con-
tract, holders of such policies are excluded altogether from par-
ticipation in surplus. In the normal case, any surplus produced by 
their policies accrues to the benefit of stock.holders. If these stock-
holders should decide, through management, to make a gift of 
some portion of surplus to a special class of policyholders, for any 
reason or for no reason, why should nonparticipating policyholders, 
who have no claim to share in the surplus anyway, have any ground 
for complaint? If anyone should have reason to object, should it 
not be the stock.holders whose money is being given away? This is a 
plausible argument, especially using a literal interpretation of the 
statute. 
However, other interpretations are more persuasive, especially 
after a consideration of the policy grounds for the enactment of 
section 3(h)(2). The Uniform Act, section 3(h)(2), contains two 
other situations to which section 3(g) does not apply.96 One is the 
return to industrial policyholders who pay direct to the home office 
Ill> N.J. STAT • .ANN. § 17:29B-4(8)(b)(i) (1963). 
06 I RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 202 n.13. 
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that portion of the premium which represents the cost of the door-
to-door collection which was formerly usual in industrial policies; 
the other is a readjustment of group life premiums based on either 
loss or expense experience thereunder. The thrust of all three ex-
ceptions to section 3(g) is that in those cases in which policyholders 
have been overcharged, it is legitimate to return noncontractual 
dividends, thereby offsetting the overcharge. Light may be thrown 
on the purpose of the first exception by a look at an incident in 
the history of the Prudential Insurance Company. The Prudential 
was organized as a stock company, issuing solely nonparticipating 
industrial policies; later it added participating ordinary insurance 
to its portfolio. At first there were no accurate life tables for use 
with industrial policies, and the experimental premiums charged 
by the company proved to be excessive. Beginning as early as 1880, 
at intervals of five to ten years, the company made the industrial 
policies in effect participating, by granting voluntary dividends 
or concessions on an ad hoc basis. Management felt that the long 
range interests of company and stockholders would be best served 
by this action, but dissident stockholders eventually brought a bill 
in equity asking for a mandatory injunction to compel the directors 
to distribute the profits as dividends to the stockholders. In 1912, 
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals upheld the exercise of 
discretion by the directors and approved the voluntary concessions 
to nonparticipating policyholders.97 
Not only is it possible to argue that the Prudential "concession" 
was the kind of bonus contemplated in the drafting of the section, 
but the overwhelming importance of equity as a factor in life in-
surance98 makes it hard to believe that a legislature would con-
sciously approve anything else. We have found no indication that 
legislatures contemplated the return of excess nonparticipating 
surplus to a group of policyholders who made no contribution to 
the surplus; the purpose of the whole of section 3(h)(2) is obviously 
to make it possible for a company to deal reasonably with policy-
holders by returning overcharges, hence, we cannot interpret it as 
permitting inequity among classes of policyholders. 
The distinction between what the Prudential did and what 
profit-sharing policies do seems clear. Prudential, out of caution 
made excessive premium charges and ultimately returned the ex-
cess. On the other hand, profit-sharing companies know in advance 
97 Blanchard v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 209, 83 Atl. 220 (1912). 
98 See note 25 supra, and notes 99, 100 infra. 
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that their premium charges are redundant, for they are deliberately 
made so; the companies propose to give the excess, not to the people 
who paid it, but to another favored group. The profit-sharing is held 
out as a special inducement to the purchase of insurance by the 
latter group at the expense of the former. 
The proviso added to section 3(h)(2) in New Jersey and else-
where strengthens this position by stating that the bonus is per-
missible "provided, that any such bonuses or abatement of pre-
miums shall be fair and equitable to policyholders .... " This only 
makes explicit what is already implicit in the section, and makes 
this statute consistent with the substantial emphasis upon equity 
throughout the whole of insurance law: 
"Equity clearly requires a system of distribution which does 
not favor any class of policies at the expense of any other 
class .... It is usually considered that, from a theoretical point 
of view at least, equity requires a return of surplus to indi-
vidual policyholders in the proportions in which they have 
contributed to it .... [F]rom a practical point of view equity 
requires a reasonable recognition of profits and the sources 
from which they have arisen."99 
The contribution method of allocation is the expression of equity 
in dividend distribution. It takes into account all variables insofar 
as they can practicably be ascertained, and contemplates that "each 
participant should be benefited in proportion to the excess of his 
payments over and above the actual cost of insurance.''100 The basic 
principle of the contribution plan provides a standard against 
which all rules of distribution should be tested for equity. 
The Wisconsin statute contains the "fair and equitable" provi-
sion.101 Arguing from it, the Wisconsin Insurance Department out-
lawed profit-sharing policies as an unfair and inequitable allocation 
of the surplus available for distribution.102 This interpretation is 
sound, but it is not essential that the "fair and equitable" provision 
be found in the statute in order to produce the same result, for 
equity is a fundamental part of insurance law without the provi-
s10n. 
00 MACLEAN &: MARSHALL, DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS 13-14 (1937). 
100 11 JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ACTUARIES 122 (1863), as quoted in KRUEGER &: 
WAGGONER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 254 (1953). The contribution method 
has received court approval. See Rhine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 1, 6 N.E.2d 
74 (1936). 
101 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 207.04(l)(i) (1957). 
102 See the note attached to Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962). 
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Of course it can be argued that if legislatures had wanted to 
limit the permissible distribution under section 3(h)(2) to non-
participating policyholders, they could easily have explicitly so 
provided. The simple answer to that contention is that the drafting 
of statutes in the United States is not an exact science, and the 
determination of legislative intent is an inquiry of considerable 
complexity. Moreover, the expression "abating their premiums" 
is at the heart of section 3(h)(2), and it seems quite reasonable to 
conclude that the distribution of surplus to nonparticipating policy-
holders, even though that was not provided in the contract, was con-
templated as the way to abate premiums. It is not clear what else 
that expression could mean. We conclude, therefore, that section 
3(h)(2) is merely intended to authorize the kind of conduct engaged 
in by the Prudential, putting beyond doubt the power of the in• 
surance company to deal equitably with its policyholders when it 
discovers that its premiums are excessive. Any other result, al-
though arguably consistent with the literal language, would be 
inconsistent with the general tenor of American insurance law. 
This result is strongly supported by a 1942 Minnesota case. A 
group of charter policyholders were entitled to an especially ad-
vantageous participation in the profits of the company. The Su-
preme Court of Minnesota held that the arrangement violated the 
anti-discrimination statutes; the court placed a lien on the charter 
policies for the benefit of the noncharter policyholders, to remain 
until such time as the excessive payments received by the charter 
policyholders were redistributed more equitably to all policyhold-
ers.1oa 
It can be concluded that profit-sharing policies are in violation 
of section 3(g), the anti-discrimination provision of the Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, and that section 3(h)(2) does not preclude 
the application of section 3(g) to them. If this result is accepted, 
it is unnecessary to ask the second question, whether section 3(£) 
prohibits profit-sharing policies. It is less clear that it does. Primar-
ily, section 3(£) is directed toward a particular kind of discrimina-
tory conduct-the use of special inducements to the purchase of 
the insurance policy. The items discussed in section 3(£) are mainly 
separable contracts or documents such as shares of stock, etc., which 
are offered as an inducement. It is tempting to simplify the inter-
pretation of the section by limiting its application to separate in-
ducements, but this may not be completely sound. There is some 
103 See Lommen v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 577, 4 N.W.2d 639 (1942). 
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basis for the argument, which is discussed later, that the charter 
policy is a new guise in which the separate advisory board contract 
is likely to reappear, and that the subterfuge of combining this 
special benefit with the policy should not succeed, hence section 
3(£) should also be applicable to prevent at least the charter policy 
form of profit sharing. 
B. The Nature of Charter Policies 
Charter polices are issued at the beginning of a company's op-
eration, and give the charter policyholder a special advantage over 
later policyholders. Although the special advantage can be almost 
anything, usually it is profit sharing. Such policies constitute a 
special class of profit-sharing policies, characterized by issuance on 
a limited basis, and for this reason it is natural to deal with them 
here. 
The charter policy is issued with an assurance that it will be 
sold only to a limited and predetermined number of persons, or 
up to a limited and predetermined total dollar amount. Thus, a 
restricted group of people is promised participation in the long-
range earnings of the company, usually arising both from the sur-
plus on the business of the charter group and from all other 
business ·written by the company, whether participating or non-
participating. 
The charter policy is subject to essentially the same criticisms as 
the profit-sharing policy. Susceptibility to misrepresentation is the 
first major objection to both, but here a special likelihood of mis-
representation is said to result from the presence of a tontine ele-
ment. The second major objection, as with profit-sharing policies 
generally, is alleged violation of nondiscrimination statutes; there 
are some special considerations which must take us somewhat be-
yond the earlier discussion. 
l. The Tontine Element-Misrepresentation 
By limiting in advance the number of policies which will be 
sold, usually to the early purchasers of insurance in the company, 
the charter policy creates a closed group. As the policies in the 
group terminate, either by death or by surrender, the size of the 
group decreases. Since the charter policyholders have been prom-
ised a share in the profits generated by policyholders other than 
those in the group, if the total amount to be distributed is not sub-
ject to the discretion of the board of directors, but depends solely 
on the company's success, then the share of the policyholder might 
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well increase in the same way that an increase occurs in the tontine 
policy. This effect is what we call the "tontine element." We have 
already seen that statutes or insurance department rulings in most 
states seek to eliminate tontine policies, primarily by requiring an 
annual ( or sometimes less frequent) distribution of surplus arising 
from the participating business.104 This tontine element is not 
dependent upon the accumulation of dividends, but rather upon 
an annual division of profits of an increasing amount among a 
decreasing number of people. Hence the prohibition of accumula-
tion has no effect on the charter policy. This tontine aspect of the 
charter policy seems relatively innocuous, and it is difficult to 
regard it as serious enough in itself to warrant intervention by the 
state. The word "tontine" has a pejorative connotation, by reason 
of historical associations, which is worse than the term deserves. Not 
every tontine element is so evil that it should be forbidden. 
In defense of the charter policy, it is sometimes argued that it 
does not really contain a tontine feature because the amount of 
dividends paid out of nonparticipating surplus lies within the dis-
cretion of the board of directors. The board determines whether 
or not it is in the best interests of the policyholders as a group, 
and of the company as a whole to distribute the surplus, and how 
much to distribute. No fixed sum or guaranteed percentage of sur-
plus is promised to the policyholders. If the board should choose 
to distribute such dividends to charter policyholders, it is not 
compelled to distribute to the surviving charter policyholders an 
amount as large as it might have distributed if the whole group 
were alive. In other words, the board of directors may reduce the 
total benefits to the group in proportion to the decrease in the 
group size. Thus the tontine element is negated. 
An answer to this contention, however, is not difficult. While 
some contracts may give such discretion to the board, others may 
not. If they do not and the amount to be shared is fixed by some 
formula, then the policy does contain the tontine element. If, 
however, discretion does exist in the board of directors, the dis-
cretion may eliminate the tontine element of the policy but it also 
destroys the policyholder's guaranteed legal rights to share in sur-
plus. His participation right is at the mercy of the board of direc-
tors. Hence, either the policy has a tontine element or it has an even 
greater deficiency. Further, while discretion in the board reduces 
the similarity of the charter policy to the tontine, this does not 
104 See statutes cited in notes 39, 40 supra and regulations cited in note 41 supra. 
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prevent the agent from impressing upon the prospect the notion 
that he is buying into a tontine contract, i.e., creating an appealing 
"tontine illusion." Sales material frequently creates this notion. 
For example, the brochure used by one company contained a dia-
gram showing the gains from the lapses and surrenders of both 
participating and nonparticipating policies flowing to the charter 
policyholders. This not only creates an impression that the profits 
will be large, but also that the charter group decreases in size, and 
thus, presumably, that an ever decreasing group of persons will 
have larger individual shares in a constant or increasing fund. Even 
if discretion exists in the board and there is misrepresentation, the 
misrepresentation is obnoxious. If there is a special likelihood of 
misrepresentation, the arrangement is especially objectionable be-
cause of that likelihood. The probability of misrepresentation does 
seem great enough to give concern about the charter policy, despite 
the relatively innocuous character of the tontine element itself. 
This likelihood of misrepresentation is in addition to that which 
is characteristic of profit-sharing policies generally. 
2. Violation of the Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
The charter policy is a modern version of an old promotional 
technique-the use of the "advisory board" contract. In the latter, 
a company 
"offers to prospective policyholders a percentage of the pre-
miums paid on policies issued by the company in that state 
[ or other specified area] over a fixed period of years. This 
percentage is to be divided among the policyholders, within 
this class, in proportion to the amount of insurance taken out 
by each. The class of policyholders entitled to this benefit is 
limited . . . . In return therefor the insured, in addition to 
paying his annual premium, agrees to become a member of a 
special 'advisory board' or 'board of reference,' or to become 
a 'special agent' or a 'local inspector,' and to render certain 
services to the company, such as advising the company as to 
the fitness and desirability of applicants for insurance . . . . 
In some instances the insured agrees to furnish annually the 
names of ten persons in his community who would ... make 
desirable risks .... " 105 
Professor Patterson has pointed out the purpose of the advisory 
board contract: 
105 PA'ITERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 315 (1927). 
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"It is designed to offer to the earlier insurants ... a reduction 
in rates which will enable it to compete with the attractions of 
the older companies .... [Generally] the courts have held that 
this marketing device is illegal, either on the ground that it is 
a 'discrimination' if the special benefits are stipulated in the 
policy or on the ground that it constitutes 'rebating' if the 
benefits are stipulated for in a collateral arrangement outside 
the policy."106 
It is true, of course, that an advisory board contract may be a 
legitimate manner in which to acquire needed services. There is 
no public policy which prevents the compensation of persons for 
the performance of valuable services even if they be only the pro-
vision of good contacts. In fact, however, most advisory board con-
tracts existed merely to enable the salesman to sell policies, hope-
fully without violating the laws against rebating or discrimination. 
Since the issuance of an advisory board contract was frequently a 
subterfuge, it could easily be argued that it was a rebate or an 
illegal discrimination; moreover, most states passed specific legis-
lation prohibiting advisory board contracts on these grounds. At 
the present time section 3(£) of the Unfair Trade Practices Act 
makes it an unfair or deceptive practice to "issue . . . any special 
or advisory board or other contracts of any kind promising returns 
and profits as an inducement to insurance .... "107 
Today, essentially the same purpose is served by the issuance of 
a charter policy which, like the advisory board contract, promises 
the policyholder that, as a member of a limited group, he will par-
ticipate with special advantage, not available to the holders of other 
types of policies issued by the same company, in any future dis-
tribution of corporate profits including the "profits" or surplus 
generated by policies other than the charter policies. The charter 
policy is used in an attempt to achieve what can no longer be 
achieved by advisory board contracts because of the statutory pro-
hibitions; the same sales argument is still used. The formal advisory 
service feature was a mere fac;ade and could easily be sacrificed. 
Some companies say they are giving charter policyholders some-
thing extra in lieu of advertising expense. Other sales presentations 
speak of "long range advisory assistance"; still other arrangements 
require name referrals to lend plausibility to the payment of a 
106 Id. at 316. 
107 1 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 202 n.13. An Advisory Board is now some-
times used to promote the sale of stock rather than policies. See, e.g., Prospectus of 
National Western Life Insurance Company, Jan. 9, 1963, p. 20. 
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special benefit. Thus, it is clear that the charter policy is function-
ally a close relative of the old advisory board technique. It is at 
least arguable that such policies are forbidden by section 3(£). If 
not, then the general anti-discrimination or anti-rebating provisions 
may apply as in the old advisory board cases. The close similarity 
of the functional characteristics of the advisory board contract and 
charter policies make the cases dealing with the former, in the early 
l 900's, relevant to the latter. · 
The advisory board contract began to appear in the opinions of 
the appellate courts in 1901, often involving suits by the company 
against the policyholder on a premium note. The policyholder's 
defense was that the policy, and therefore the premium note, was 
void because it was connected with a contract under which the 
policyholder was appointed to an advisory board or was made one 
of a number of "vice-counselors." Usually the policy did not men-
tion the advisory board contract. The Indiana Appellate Court 
thought that even if the appointment of the policyholder as a vice-
counsellor were void, the policy was still effective since the two were 
separate transactions.108 The North Carolina Supreme Court also 
enforced premium notes.109 On the other hand, the Michigan Su-
preme Court thought that the illegality of the advisory board con-
tract infected the contract of insurance and therefore the company 
could not recover on the premium note.11° In these cases, the 
Indiana and North Carolina courts did not decide that the con-
tracts were illegal, but the language of the opinions suggests that 
they would have so decided if the question had been fairly raised. 
The Michigan court did hold the contract illegal. The principal 
difference was in the courts' views on the technical doctrine of 
severance; by separating the two contracts, Indiana and North 
Carolina were able to uphold the insurance policy without reaching 
the question of legality. 
In a second Indiana case, a receiver for a company sued on an 
unpaid portion of the premium which had not been paid because 
it was the sum due the policyholder under a special "combination" 
contract. The company was a mutual, which argued for equality 
among its members. Moreover, its articles and by-laws made every 
member an advisory agent "entitled to all its rights and privileges as 
fully as any other member." The court enforced the receiver's 
claim, saying that 
10s Muller v. State Life Ins. Co., 27 Ind. App. 45, 60 N.E. 958 (1901). 
109 Security Life 8e Annuity Co. v. Costner, 149 N.C. 293, 63 S.E. 304 (1908). 
110 State Life Ins. Co. v. Strong, 127 Mich. 346, 86 N.W. 825 (1901). 
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"[P]ersons not parties to this arrangement ... must pay in 
addition to the cost of their own insurance an additional ... 
[ amount] for the benefit of others .... The plan is marked not 
by mutuality but by inequality and unfairness."111 
Another form of action was suit by the policyholder on the 
advisory contract itself. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied 
recovery, applying the general rule that a court will leave the 
parties to an illegal contract where it finds them.112 The anti-dis-
crimination statute, the court emphasized, was intended for the 
protection of the whole body of policyholders and not those seek-
ing to profit by the inequity of the contract. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court also refused recovery by the policyholder on the 
advisory contract.113 If the services had been substantial and really 
performed, the court would have regarded the arrangement as 
valid, but it was convinced this was merely a device to camouflage 
discriminatory practices. 
In Wisconsin the problem arose in still a different context. A 
policyholder sued in one case to recover the first annual premium, 
although the policy was accompanied by a contract irrevocably 
appointing the policyholder a member of the company's state 
board of special agents for twenty years. The court allowed recovery 
because of the promptness of the rescission.114 However, the court 
refused another policyholder's claim to recover four annual pay-
ments already made, pointing to the bad effect upon other policy-
holders if favored ones were permitted, after having the benefit of 
the contract, to make claims on the company's surplus, or to rescind 
the contract and recover the premiums.115 
In a curious case, an agent sought an injunction against breach 
of the agency agreement by a refusal by the company to accept ap-
plications for special policies connected with contracts appointing 
"local inspectors." The Georgia Supreme Court denied the relief, 
111 Robison v. Wolf, 27 Ind. App. 683, 691, 62 N.E. 74, 77 (1901). See also State Life Ins. 
Co. v. Strong, supra note 110, at 350-51, 86 N.W. at 826. 
112 Smathers v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 151 N.C. 98, 65 S.E. 746 (1909). 
11s Richmond v. Conservative Life Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 334, 165 N.W. 286 (1917). The 
Des Moines Life Insurance Company had issued many special agent's contracts of the 
kind invalidated in the prior cases by the supreme court; it sought to keep faith with 
such policyholders by replacing these contracts with fifteen-payment life policies back-
dated to the date of the original contract, but the Attorney General ruled that this 
action would be a rebate on the ground that the initial contracts were entirely void. 
1908 WIS. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. AND OPINIONS 463. 
114 Urwan v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 125 Wis. 349, 103 N.W. 1102 (1905). 
115 Laun v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 555, 111 N.W. 660 (1907). 
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basing its action on the illegality of the contract under the statute 
prohibiting advisory board and similar contracts.116 
The advisory contract appeared in a variety of regulatory 
problems also. In Wisconsin, the Attorney General first advised the 
Insurance Commissioner, upon request, that an advisory contract 
was a violation of the anti-rebate statute, and then said in a subse-
quent opinion that a contract for the appointment of "special 
inspectors" or of "special agents" without real duties was within 
his prior ruling.117 The Wisconsin legislature removed all doubts 
about the particular form when in 1907 it made the advisory board 
contract illegal.118 
In Mississippi, the court was asked to order the Insurance Com-
missioner to revoke a company license for issuing contracts illegal 
under the anti-discrimination statute. Although the court agreed 
that there had been a violation, it regarded mandamus as an inap-
propriate remedy, since the Commissioner's action was discretion-
ary, not ministerial.119 In Michigan, the supreme court denied man-
damus to compel the Commissioner to license the complainant 
company, because the company's operation violated the anti-rebate 
law.120 
Despite the variety of ways in which the problem arose, and 
despite the fact that the companies won a number of the decisions, 
the overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition 
that advisory board and similar contracts, under whatever name, 
are illegal. Only one court has thus far thought otherwise. The Su-
preme Court of Alabama granted an injunction to prevent the In-
surance Commissioner from revoking a company's license to do 
business in Alabama, holding that the questioned contract, which 
was in all essential respects like the contracts involved in prior 
cases discussed above, was not objectionable under Alabama law.121 
The court thought there was "discrimination" only if different 
members of a class of policyholders were treated differently, and in 
this case all members were treated alike. The court remarked that 
if the term "class" applied to all persons of like individual charac-
110 Leonard v. American Life & Annuity Co., 139 Ga. 274, 77 S.E. 41 (1913). 
117 1904 WIS. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. AND OPINIONS 368; 1906 id. 618. But compare 
the earlier opinion in 1904, id. at 295, holding that there was nothing illegal on the face 
of an advisory board contract. 
118 Wis. Laws 1907, ch. 504 § 1955(3), now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 207.04(1)(£) (1957). Note 
that the problem of validity of earlier contracts continued to arise in the cases for many 
years thereafter. See note 11!! supra. 
110 Cole v. State, 91 Miss. 628, 45 So. 11 (1907). 
120 Citizens' Life Ins. Co. v. Commission, 128 Mich. 85, 87 N.W. 126 (1901). 
121 Julian v. Guarantee Life Ins. Co., 159 Ala. 533, 49 So. 234 (1909). 
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teristics, an insurance company could not change any of the terms 
of the contracts that it issued. This would impair freedom of con-
tract. The position of the court is plausible, but it is doubtful that 
it is sound. Professor Patterson thought that the "reasoning [was] 
question-begging, since it would permit the insurer to discriminate 
with impunity simply by multiplying the number of 'classes' of 
policyholders."122 Under the decision, companies could evade and 
nullify the intent of the anti-discrimination statute. 
Professor Patterson himself has cast some doubt on the sound-
ness of the advisory board cases: 
"[I]t can scarcely be denied that the first thousand policy-
holders in a newly formed life company receive less protection 
value per $1000 of insurance than do the second thousand; for 
while the protection is the same by a purely legalistic standard 
(that is, the amount of money which the insurer obligates itself 
to pay), the early insurants take the grave risk that the new 
company may not survive the dangerous first years. Hence, it is 
quite arguable that to allow the early policyholders a reduction 
in premium is no 'discrimination' .... [T]he 'discrimination' 
in favor of earlier insurants is no discrimination at all but is 
merely adjusting the premium charge to fit the actual protec-
tion which the insurant receives."123 
There is some merit to his point. It is doubtful, of course, that the 
salesman of the specialty policy would be willing to admit to his 
prospect this justification for a rate differential. But if the terms of 
the policy are to be justified as against the anti-discrimination 
statute on the basis of the greater risk inherent in the purchase of 
a policy during the early years of a company's life, it would seem 
appropriate that the policyholder be apprised of the reasons for 
his advantage. Instead, the appeal is to his cupidity. Despite his 
theoretical justification for the issuance of advisory board contracts, 
Professor Patterson recognized that the system "is deceptive be-
cause, like most other 'cheap insurance' schemes, it leads the 
average policyholder to believe that he is getting something for 
nothing. He is led to think that he is among the 'favored few,' and 
cupidity outruns caution."124 Moreover, if the advisory board con-
tract were justified as non-discriminatory, in view of the greater 
risk that the early policyholders run, there perhaps should be some 
consideration of whether the risk and the preferential treatment are 
122 PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 105, at 317. 
12s Id. at 317-18. 
124 Id. at 318. 
1963] SPECIALTY POLICIES 219 
reasonably related to one another, or whether the preferential treat-
ment of the advisory board policyholder is excessive in relation to 
the extra risk that is incurred. It may be the other way around; 
the extra risk may be substantial, while the preferential treatment 
is meager-grossly exaggerated in sales presentation but in actual-
ity hedged by language in the contract itself. 
So far as appears from appellate opinions and other readily 
accessible sources, the advisory board contract did not survive the 
first decade or so after its introduction. If it were reintroduced in 
the same form, it would certainly be held illegal everywhere, in 
view of the overwhelming weight of authority. The case is even 
stronger now in view of the widespread enactment of the Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, section 3(g) of which forbids a company to 
"make or permit any distinction or discrimination in favor of indi-
viduals between those of the same class and equal expectation of 
life ... in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon . . . ," 
and section 3(£) of which explicitly forbids the advisory board con-
tract. 
The question that remains is whether the advisory board con-
tract cases are applicable to its modern counterpart, the charter 
policy. Section 3(£) seems to contemplate a separate inducement and 
may not be applicable. Two distinctions throw doubt on the appli-
cability of the anti-discrimination provision of section 3(g). One is 
that the charter policy imposes no duties upon the favored policy-
holders, although the duties in the advisory board contracts were 
merely apparent. However, the charter policy is not less, but rather 
more objectionable because no attempt is made to give even the 
appearance of consideration for the extra benefits to be received. 
Another distinction is that the advisory board contract was col-
lateral to, but dependent upon a separate insurance policy, while 
the charter policy combines the entire transaction in one contract. 
Hence, the charter policy seems even more clearly to be in viola-
tion of the anti-discrimination statute. 
On the whole, therefore, it seems to be sound for charter poli-
cies which contain a profit-sharing feature to be held illegal under 
the anti-discrimination statutes on the authority of the advisory 
board contract cases decided early in the century; for practical 
purposes the two are the same. The Wisconsin Insurance Depart-
ment thought the statute applicable; it prohibited the issuance of 
charter policies, holding that the charter policy violated not only 
section 3(£) of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, but also the more 
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general anti-discrimination provision in section 3(g).124a The char-
ter policyholder, like the old advisory board policyholder, either 
has an unfair advantage over other policyholders or he is mis-
led in the sales presentation by an appeal to his greed. The 
charter policy, like the profit-sharing policy, is inherently mislead-
ing to the policyholder or is discriminatory against other policy-
holders. There seems no middle position into which it can fall; in 
either event the charter policy, like its predecessor, is objectionable. 
Because of its recent development (or its recent notoriety), there 
is little direct authority on the charter policy. One interesting case 
did appear in Minnesota, however. A charter policyholder, as 
representative of his class, sought an accounting, contending that 
while the directors had given special treatment to the charter 
policyholders, they had not fairly allocated to them all that they 
were entitled to receive. In effect, the special dividend provision 
secured to the charter policyholder, after five years, a return of 
one hundred percent of the surplus generated by his class of poli-
cies. On the other hand, the dividend provision in the noncharter 
policies provided that the policyholder would share in the surplus 
(necessarily surplus other than that generated by the charter poli-
cies) as ascertained and apportioned by the company. The effort 
backfired, however. On its own motion, the court asked whether 
it was not a violation of the Minnesota statutes to set up the charter 
members as a favored class, and sent the case back for consideration 
of the question, suggesting that the trial court see that the non-
charter policyholders were represented by counsel of their own.125 
On the second round, the court held that the participating pro-
visions of the charter policies were in violation of the anti-discrimi-
nation statute and decreed an accounting, subjecting the future 
earnings of the charter policies to a lien in favor of the noncharter 
policies.126 If the old advisory board cases are sound, it is hard to 
question this decision. 
C. Methods of Control of Profit-Sharing and Charter Policies 
The foregoing analysis has shown that both a special sus-
ceptibility to misrepresentation and a discriminatory character are 
inherent in these classes of policies. If the first defect were all we 
had to combat, it would be important to answer the question 
whether the dangers of misrepresentation were so substantial that 
124a See note 102 supra. 
125 Lommen v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 608, 289 N.W. 582 (1940). 
126 Lommen v. Modem Life Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 577, 4 N.W.2d 639 (1942). 
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they could not effectively be countered by enforcement of existing 
laws against misrepresentation, or by the development of new laws 
forbidding specific kinds of misrepresentation. An earlier article 
has shown the difficulties in control of that kind, 127 but despite those 
difficulties one should be reluctant to use the stringent weapon of 
prohibition unless failure to do so would present serious conse-
quences. A number of states have tried the intermediate method; 
some have prohibited the use of such terms as "profit-sharing" or 
"charter" either in the policy or in advertising material.128 Others 
have prohibited a long list of statements and practices, not only for 
these policies but also for others.129 But charter and profit-sharing 
policies are not only peculiarly susceptible to misrepresentation, 
but are objectionable on other grounds as well. There is little 
justification for continuing their use. Even if the principle of free-
dom of contract might overcome our inclination to prohibit in 
order to prevent misrepresentation, it can hardly be argued that 
freedom of contract should also overcome the strong policy of the 
law in favor of doing equity among groups of policyholders so 
far as is possible. Profit-sharing and charter policies should be pro-
hibited on the ground that they seriously compromise important 
values sought by the legal system.130 
D. The Applicability of Securities Legislation 
On November 30, 1960, Mr. Harold G. Lohren of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission addressed the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners and, after describing the profit-sharing 
policy, said: 
"Now, when we get into the area of inducing the sale of in-
surance through a feature in a policy such as I have been de-
121 See Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. 
REY. 141 (1961). 
128 E.g., Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 33, Aug. 8, 1961; Ga. Dep't of Ins. Reg. June 24, 
1958; Nev. Dep't of Ins. Bull. 58-4, July 1, 1958; N.D. Dep't of Ins. Reg., April 10, 1961; 
S.C. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 1-60, 1960; Ind. Dep't of Ins. circular letter Dec. 16, 1959. 
Many of the regulations in this and the following two footnotes will be found in the 
WEE!tLY UNDERWRITER, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT SERVICE. 
120 E.g., Colo. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 37, Nov. 1, 1962; Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, 
Oct. 31, 1962; Kan. Ins. Dep't Reg. 48-11-10, June 13, 1963; Ky. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Feb. 9, 
1959; Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. III-9, Jan. 19, 1962; Neb. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Rule 26, 
Dec. 20, 1962; N.M. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Reg., Aug. 6, 1962; Wyo. Ins. Dep't Bull. 116, 
July 3, 1962. 
130 Seyeral states have enunciated outright prohibitions of profit-sharing policies, e.g., 
statement made by the California Insurance Commissioner, J. of Commerce, March 7, 
1960, p. 9, col. l; La. Dep't of Ins. Reg. Nov. 13, 1962; Utah Dep't of Ins. Bull. 60-5, 
May 16, 1960; W. Va. Ins. Dep't Ruling No. 3311, May 13, 1963; Wis. Adm. Code section 
Ins. 2.08 (1962). 
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scribing, which represents nothing more nor less than a par-
ticipation in a profit-sharing arrangement-and I use those 
words advisedly because then I put my finger on one of the 
fundamental definitions of a security as defined in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, a profit-sharing arrangement, an investment 
contract. And at this juncture, the Commission gets concerned, 
so that we have a dual concern with the Insurance Commis-
sioners and the insurance industry as well as the securities 
side .... 
"I don't know what the solution to the problem is. In the 
Commission, in such instances as we have run across these poli-
cies-and I could say that I have hit about 25 different ones in 
the last two to three years-we have taken the position that a 
security is involved. We have advised the company that it 
should register that security if it proposes to sell it, and we 
have also taken the position that an investment company is 
involved."181 
If Mr. Lohren is correct, and the profit-sharing policy is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
regulation by that federal agency provides a method of control 
that might be fairly effective. Submission to the registration and 
disclosure provisions of the securities legislation would be incon-
venient to insurance companies, which already must comply with 
a complex regime of state insurance regulation. Of course, in-
surance companies are now subject to securities regulation when 
they issue stock, and this applies also to offbeat issues, such as 
guaranty fund certificates.182 Here, however, we are talking about 
what are basically insurance policies. A threat of intervention by 
the Commission would tend, in most cases, to induce the company 
not to sell the questioned policy. Moreover, if the policy is a security 
subject to registration and is not registered, the policyholder will 
be able to rescind and get his full premium back. This would be a 
stringent sanction which would probably be quite effective.183 
For these reasons it becomes of some importance for us to con-
sider the question of whether the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has jurisdiction, and if so, whether it should exercise its 
181 LIFE COMM. REPORT, N.A.I.C., 19-31, Nov. 30, 1960. 
182 Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962). 
188 Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1958). 
Misrepresentations through the mails or other means of interstate communication also 
produce this result. 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Ul58). See also Securities 
Act of 1933, § 16, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958); Securities Act of 1933, § 24g, 
48 Stat. 87, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1958). 
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power. The starting point is the McCarran Act, which provides 
in section 2(b): 
"No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, 
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifi-
cally relates to the business of insurance .... "134 
If the Securities Act "specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance," it has effect despite state regulation. If it does not "specifi-
cally relate," it can have effect only if it does not invalidate, impair, 
or supersede, the state laws respecting insurance. Although the 
matter is not free from doubt, it is possible that, as Mr. Lohren 
suggested, an insurance policy of the profit-sharing type is a secu-
rity within the basic definition of section 2 of the Securities Act, 
which says that "the term 'security' means any . . . certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement .... "135 
The doubt is suggested by the language of the House of Representa-
tives Report on the Securities Bill. The Committee said that the 
exemption of insurance 
"makes clear what is already implied in the act, namely, that 
insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities subject 
to the provisions of the act. The insurance policy and like 
contracts are not regarded in the commercial world as securi-
ties .... The entire tenor of the act would lead, even without 
this specific exemption, to the exclusion of insurance policies 
from the provisions of the act, but the specific exemption is 
included to make misinterpretation impossible."136 
A profit-sharing agreement of the type with which we are pres-
ently concerned is a part of an ordinary insurance policy, arising 
within the framework of the insurance institution, and the profit-
sharing feature is only peripheral to it. It is possible, of course, that 
there may be similar contracts in which the insurance aspect is 
the merest pretense; in such case this argument is not valid. But 
we are concerned here with contracts which are largely insurance, 
whatever may be the representations of the soliciting agents. In 
the absence of a strong showing that the Securities Act was intended 
to pick up every contract containing any security element, an 
institutionally or functionally oriented analysis would lead to a 
134 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1958). 
185 Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(i) (1958). 
186 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933). 
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conclusion that we are not dealing with securities, but rather with 
insurance. 
On the assumption, however, that the profit-sharing policy is a 
"security," section 3 of the act then goes on to exempt certain 
classes of securities from the provisions of the act, except as ex-
pressly provided. One of the exempt securities is "any insurance or 
endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, 
issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance 
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer per-
forming like functions, of any State or Territory of the United 
States or the District of Columbia .... "187 Finally, section 17, 
which proscribes certain fraudulent acts, states that the exemptions 
of section 3 do not apply to the provisions of section 17 .138 
It would be difficult to argue that a profit-sharing policy of the 
type with which we have been dealing is not an insurance policy. 
Moreover,' all states regulate the life insurance business. That 
being the case, application of the exemption of section 3 seems 
clear; the registration and disclosure provisions of the Securities 
Act seem not to apply to the profit-sharing policy even if it is 
admitted to be a security within the meaning of the act. The case 
is less clear with respect to section 17, where the exemption does 
not apply. It is possible to argue that the explicit exemption in 
section 3 is a kind of specific reference to insurance that, when it is 
negated by section 17, makes the latter section "specifically relate 
to the business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran 
Act.139 It is possible to argue this, and thus to urge that the fraud 
section of the Securities Act is applicable to insurance, even if the 
registration and disclosure provisions are not. It is also necessary to 
argue this, for unless the section does specifically relate to insurance 
it may not invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws. The argu-
ment is not really persuasive, for it makes better sense to interpret 
the negation of the exemption as leaving the act as if there were no 
listing of insurance at all. This is all the more likely to be true be-
cause the legislative history of the act shows that the purpose of 
the exemption for insurance was to make clear "what is already 
implied in the act, namely, that insurance policies are not to be 
187 Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(8) (1958). 
138 Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (1958). Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § lO(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78G)(b) (1958) is even more extensively used 
in fraud cases. The exemption does not apply to it. 
1s11 This same argument does not seem valid for § IO(b), the fraud section of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, since there is no exemption section to provide the 
needed reference. 
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regarded as securities subject to the provisions of the act."140 Al-
though certain insurance policies (but not all) fall within the def-
inition of a security to be found within the act, that is not enough 
to subject them to section 17 without specific reference to insur-
ance. It is not enough, that is, unless it can be said that the Securi-
ties Act does not invalidate, impair, or supersede state laws regu-
lating insurance, and there can be little room for doubt that 
application to profit-sharing policies of registration and disclosure 
provisions of the act would seriously impair and partially supersede 
the complex regime of state regulation of life insurance. It is only a 
little less certain that the same would be true of the application of 
the fraud provisions, in view of the existence in every state of some 
version of the Uniform Unfair Trade Practices Act.141 There would 
be no impairment and no supersession only if the provisions of the 
two acts were completely consistent and complementary, not con-
current. This is hardly conceivable. 
An additional possibility for justifying the application of the 
fraud provision of the Securities Act to the profit-sharing policy 
would be the interpretation of the state securities laws to take the 
profit-sharing policy out from under insurance regulation, and sub-
ject it to state securities regulation. In that case, the McCarran Act 
would no longer be applicable, nor would the exemption of section 
3 of the Securities Act, and the whole range of other provisions of 
the Securities Act would apply in a proper case. But the tendency in 
state legislation is in the other direction. More often than not, the 
exemption in the state securities act for insurance is broader than 
in the federal securities legislation. For example, the Iowa Securi-
ties Act exempts from application of the act "any security ... 
issued by . . . any life insurance company under the insurance 
department of this state."142 
A final possibility is the determination that for purposes of 
federal law, the profit-sharing policy is not an insurance contract 
at all, but rather is a security or investment, by analogy to the treat-
ment of the variable annuity given in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co.143 But in the view of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for 
the Court in the case, the variable annuity was not insurance be-
HO See note 136 supra; l Loss, SECURlTIES REcuLATION 497, n.116 (2d ed. 1961). 
141 See note 94 supra for discussion of this act. 
142 IOWA CODE § 502.4(6) (1962). See also, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.3(M) 
(Smith-Hurd 1953); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-312(5) (1958). Compare Donovan v. Dixon, 261 
Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432 (1962) with Bates v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 206 Minn. 
482, 288 N.W. 834 (1939). 
HS 359 U.S. 65 (1959). 
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cause it placed all of the investment risk on the annuitant, i.e., there 
was no guarantee of fixed income. The concept of insurance, he felt, 
involved some investment risk-taking on the part of the company. 
As to the basic portion of the profit-sharing policy, there is invest-
ment risk-taking by the company, as well as an assumption of the 
mortality risk. It is only in the supplementary features of the 
policy that there is anything Mr. Justice Douglas would not regard 
as insurance. It would be a remarkable extension of the V ALIG 
case to say a profit-sharing policy is not insurance, and thus subject 
it to the regulatory power of the Securities and Exchange Com-
m1ss1on. 
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan144 is another 
matter, and the subject cannot be left without recognition of his 
position. He was concerned with the question of whether insurance 
regulation or investment regulation was the more appropriate 
for the variable annuity. He concluded that the latter was, and 
he might conceivably reach the same result with respect to profit-
sharing policies. The pronouncement of Mr. Lohren suggests that 
the Commission's thinking runs in the same direction, as does 
the recent opinion of the Commission in the Prudential case.145 
If it is assumed, contrary to the conclusions of this argument, 
that the Securities Act is applicable to the profit-sharing policy, 
there remains some question of whether the Commission should 
choose this as an appropriate place to exert its influence. Undoubt-
edly it has more tasks than it has personnel and funds to handle, and 
it is doubtful that this is a place where the Commission should try to 
make its influence felt, inasmuch as there is now full control over 
the life insurance industry at the state level, and it is currently the 
public policy of the United States to leave basic decisions about 
insurance to be made at that level. Moreover, of the types of spe-
cialty policies which this article considers, only profit-sharing and 
possibly, under certain interpretations, the tontine are even argu-
ably within the jurisdiction of the Commission. There is merit in 
having a single agency which can see the entire problem provide 
comprehensive regulation for this whole group of coverages, rather 
than attempt a piecemeal regulation. Only the state insurance de-
partments, not the Securities and Exchange Commission, could 
provide this comprehensive oversight. The problem is most appro-
priate for solution by the insurance regulatory authorities; only if 
144 Id. at 73-93. 
145 Decision of Securities and Exchange Com.mission (File No. 812-1386), Jan. 22, 1963. 
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there is no action in that quarter should the Securities and Ex-
change Commission consider intervening. Even then, the serious 
doubt that exists about its power should lead the Commission to 
leave the matter alone, despite the fact that some persons in the 
life insurance business would welcome the intervention. 
VI. COUPON POLICIES 
Neither the coupon policy nor vigorous criticism of it is new; as 
early as 1905, some companies issued coupon policies. For example, 
one policy140 contained nineteen coupons which could be used to 
reduce premiums, to purchase additional paid-up life insurance, or 
could be left to accumulate interest for the remainder of the coupon 
· period of twenty years. In another early policy, we find the coupons 
payable annually beginning one year after the insurance date "as a 
dividend guaranteed."147 The coupon policy probably developed 
from the competition benveen participating and nonparticipating 
policies, 148 and at first was commonly referred to as the "guaranteed 
dividend" policy. By 1913 approximately sixty companies seem to 
have been issuing coupon or guaranteed dividend policies.149 
Criticism of the coupon or guaranteed dividend policy began at 
once. In a statement to the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners in 1909, the Oklahoma Commissioner said that the issu-
ance of such policies was "hurting the country," and that "no man 
. . . [ would] defend it."150 The Association classed the coupons 
with "frills that are foreign to legitimate life insurance" and re-
solved disapproval, urging its members "to discountenance such 
methods as highly deceptive and misleading."151 The actuary for the 
Wisconsin department said the purpose of such a policy was "sim-
ply to mislead the public into thinking they will get a big profit on 
their money."152 The conservative companies also criticized the 
146 This policy, issued by Security Mutual Life Insurance Co., was discussed in a 
letter dated March 24, 1905, which appeared in 10 LIFE INSURANCE CoURANT 265 (1904-1905). 
147 Such a policy was involved in Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Wier, 135 Ga. 130, 68 S.E. 
1035 (1910). 
148 See Cathles, Coupon Policies-Their Advantages and Disadvantages and a Descrip-
tion of an Original Office Method of Caring for Exceptional Policies, 2 AMERICAN INSTI-
TUTE OF ACTUARIES, THE RECORD, pt. 2, at 1 (Nov. 1913). Mr. Cathles was with the 
Southwestern Life Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas. "The inability of the participating com-
pany to guarantee its dividends formed a tempting opening for the nonparticipating 
company •••• " Id. at 2. Policies were issued at participating rates but with guaranteed 
premium reductions after the first year. 
HO Id. at 8. 
150 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, FORTIETH SESSION 
39 (1909). 
151 Id. at 146-50. 
152 Id. at 148. 
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policies as misleading; they urged that the word "dividend" and 
the word "coupon" suggested a return to the stockholder or policy-
holder in the nature of profit or interest on principal, whereas in 
fact in the coupon policies there is a return of principal.153 Nor did 
the criticism remain merely at this level. The Minnesota legislature 
in 1913 flatly prohibited the issuance of coupon policies.154 
Criticism, however, did not stop the use of coupon policies, 
which have been issued more or less continuously ever since. In 
1937, for example, one policy contained coupons that could be 
surrendered for cash, applied to reduce the premium, or used to 
purchase a pure endowment addition which would increase the 
paid-up values of the policy and, if repeated each year, would 
mature it as an endowment for the face value after twenty years.m 
Another had similar options except that the purchase of a fully 
paid-up policy at an earlier date required surrender of all the cou-
pons; an additional option was to let the coupons accumulate at 
3 ½ percent compound interest.156 
Today a typical coupon policy provides that the coupons may 
be used in any of four ways. A coupon may be surrendered to 
reduce the premium, for a cash amount equal to its face value, 
for nonparticipating paid-up additions to coverage, or it may be 
held to accumulate with interest for a specified number of years. 
Additional options occasionally exist. One, for example, would 
permit the policyholder to direct the company to pay the money 
to anyone he designated; the intention of the company was to en-
courage the use of the coupons to buy stock from a designated 
broker. Another would use the coupons to buy shares in an affiliated 
mutual fund,157 and still another to buy shares in the insurance 
company itself.158 
It is uncertain how widespread the present use of coupon poli-
cies is. However, recent action of several states to prohibit or con-
trol coupons is an indication of extensive use. Two states now have 
prohibitory statutes.159 Within the past few years seven state m-
15s See Cathles, supra note 148, pt. 2, p. 3. 
154 Minn. Laws 1913, ch. 443, § 1, now MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945). 
155 Such a policy was involved in Adroin v. Great So. Life Ins. Co., 186 La. 583, 173 
So. 112 (1937). 
156 Such a policy was involved in General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 130 F.2d 
511 (9th Cir. 1942). 
157 An arrangement such as this was involved in the Matter of MidAmerica Mutual 
Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3612, Jan. 11, 1963. 
158 See Prospectus of National Western Life Ins. Co., Jan. 9, 1963, p. 3. Cf. Prospectus 
of National Sec. Life Ins. Co., March I, 1962, p. 7. 
159 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-503 (1960). Also, in 
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surance departments have prohibited them, 160 and fifteen depart-
ments have issued regulations using other methods of control.161 
But until quite recently coupon policies were legal in nearly all 
the states and were issued by dozens of companies.162 It is not pos-
~ible. to be much more precise without an unprofitably extensive 
mqmry. 
A coupon added to a life insurance policy is not fundamentally 
complicated. In lay language, the level premium life insurance 
contract can be regarded as a combination insurance policy and 
savings account. The savings account grows throughout the life 
of the policy, while the insured sum decreases. The total of the two 
is equal to the amount payable under the policy. When coupons 
are appended to the contract, it merely means that an additional 
and separate savings element is added, and the coupon options do 
no more than state what the policyholder is permitted to do with 
the extra savings account that he has established with the insurance 
1963 the Kansas legislature repealed § 40-430, which had affirmatively permitted the is-
suance of coupon policies. Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 262, § I. 
160 See Mich. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Oct. 19, 1962; N.D. Dep't of Ins. Reg., April 10, 
1961; W. Va. Ins. Dep't Rule No. 3311, May 13, 1963; Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 
2.08 (1962); N.J. Dep't of Banking and Ins., Reg. No. I-1963A-l, July 15, 1963. A 
companion to the last regulation, No. I-1963A-2, prohibits the use of passbooks and 
language referring either to "passbooks" or "premium deposits" or similar language 
suggesting savings. Most of these regulations may be found in the WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, 
INS. DEP'T SERVICE. See also letter from Charles C. Dubuar, Chief Actuary of N.Y. Ins. 
Dep't, to Pak H. Louis, July 29, 1952; letter from Carl Stumer, Deputy Commissioner of 
Dep't of Ins. of S.D., to Charles Manson, Commissioner of Wis. Dep't of Ins., Nov. 30, 
1961. 
161 These regulations are of two types. The first embodies a disclosure approach; it 
requires that the amount of the gross premium allocated to the coupon be stated on the 
face of the policy. See Fla. Dep't of Ins., Bull. No. 33, Aug. 8, 1961; Kan. Ins. Dep't 
Rule 48-11-10, ,r I, July 1, 1963; La. Dep't of Ins., ,r 5, Nov. 13, 1962; N.C. Ins. Dep't 
Reg., July 15, 1960; S.C. Ins. Comm'n, Reg., July 31, 1962; Va. Corp. Comm'n Reg., 
Sept. 22, 1958; letter from Earl Nicholson, Deputy and Actuary of the Nev. Ins. Dep't, 
Aug. 24, 1962. Ga. Dep't of Ins. Regulation, June 24, 1958, employs a modified disclosure 
approach by allowing the company the option of stating separately the amount of the 
premium for the coupon or of stating on the face of the policy that "the premium 
above includes an extra premium for coupon benefits." The second type is a limited 
prohibition. Five insurance departments attempt to regulate coupon policies by pro-
hibiting language which states or implies that coupons represent interest earnings, return 
on investment, etc. See Ill. Dep't of Ins. Reg. 9.09, § 5(9), Oct. 31, 1962; announcement 
made by the Ind. Dep't of Ins., Dec. 16, 1959; Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. 111-9, Jan. 19, 
1962; Va. State Corp. Comm. Reg., Sept. 22, 1958; Wyo. Ins. Dep't Reg. ,r 2(c), July 3, 
1962. There are two proposed regulations: N.M. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Reg., ,r 2(c), 
Aug. 6, 1962; Neb. Dep't of Ins. Proposed Rule No. 26, Dec. 20, 1962. The Nebraska 
proposed regulation talks in terms of a "series of one-year pure endowments or a series 
of guaranteed periodic benefit," which would include coupons. But in light of NEB. 
REv. STAT. § 44-503 (1960), which already prohibits coupons, this regulation appears to 
go farther and prevent efforts to avoid the statute by a change in form. Most of these 
regulations may be found in the ,VEEKLY UNDERWRITER, INS. DEP'T SERVICE. 
162 See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
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company. Technically, coupons "should be treated as a series of 
pure endowments in the calculation of minimum cash values under 
the Standard Nonforfeiture Law."163 An endowment is essentially 
a savings element in an insurance policy. 
A. Objections to Coupons 
There is nothing sinister or even objectionable about a savings 
account. Indeed, it is widely thought to be a good thing for private 
persons to save money in a capitalistic society, for some of the money 
is likely to be channeled into investment in new enterprise, as a 
result of which the economy expands. If there is nothing objection-
able about a savings account, there is nothing inherently wrong 
with a high-savings insurance policy, or with a pure endowment. 
Likewise there is nothing wrong with a coupon in itself. 
I. Inherent Vice in the Coupon Policy 
But is it objectionable in the way it is used? This question has 
two aspects. It may be asked first whether the combination of an 
insurance policy and a series of pure endowments is bad when 
neither is bad in itself, simply because the combination has no 
legitimate economic function, because it tends to increase the cost 
of insurance, because it makes pure insurance unavailable to those 
who need it, or for any other reason? Second, is the coupon policy 
evil because it is peculiarly susceptible to misrepresentation and 
deception? 
It would be hard to argue that it is always bad in itself to com-
bine insurance coverage and savings. To so argue would lead in-
evitably to the further proposition that all forms of life insurance 
other than term insurance are bad. Ordinary life insurance, limited 
payment life insurance, and endowment policies are all combina-
tions of pure life insurance with a savings element. Both insurance 
and savings are benign institutions, and in combination as well as 
apart they are valuable adjuncts of the economy. Nor it is easy to 
argue that it is bad per se to have such a large savings component as 
exists in the coupon policy. The savings component of the usual 
coupon policy is not as large as that in many endowment policies 
issued by the most conservative companies. It cannot be argued 
that the high-savings insurance policy is evil if it is sold to people 
who want it or need it. It would be equally difficult to say that the 
163 See Report of the Hooker Committee of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 119 
(1951). 
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coupon policy is inherently bad if it is sold to the right people. Nor 
would the existence of coupon policies necessarily exclude term in-
surance or lower-price ordinary life insurance from the market, 
making them unavailable to people who need them. One must con-
clude, unless there are arguments which are not apparent, that there 
is nothing in the nature of the coupon policy that makes it unsuit-
able as a commodity readily available in the market, provided only 
that it is not put into the hands of people who are in need of some-
thing else. 
2. Susceptibility to Misrepresentation 
Before there should be a prohibition of the issuance of coupon 
policies in order to prevent misrepresentation and misleading of 
policyholders, there should be a showing that the problem is serious 
and that it cannot be solved or sufficiently ameliorated in any other 
way. It is necessary, therefore, that we attempt to determine how 
serious the problem is and whether it can be solved by steps short 
of prohibiting the use of coupons. 
The choice of the word "dividend" in connection with these 
policies has sometimes been attacked as misleading in itself, and 
prohibition of its use has been proposed. It is true that the word 
"dividend" suggests profits, by virtue of its long association with 
the distribution of corporate profits to stockholders. Indeed, for 
many years there have been actuaries who have objected to its use 
in connection with any life insurance policies, since "dividends" 
under a participating policy, and "guaranteed dividends" under a 
nonparticipating coupon policy, are both repayments of over-
charges rather than profits in the usual sense. But this proves too 
much, for if use of the term "dividend" were to be forbidden, it 
would require a change of terminology for all participating in-
surance, and there is no serious contention that the term is suf-
ficiently misleading when used by the conservative participating 
companies to justify prohibiting its use. 
The word "coupon" has also been asserted to be misleading, 
because of its long association with the payment of interest on 
bonds. Thus, it is thought to mislead policyholders into supposing 
that the coupons represent interest or profits on the principal, 
rather than the return of overcharges. There may be an element 
of truth in this assertion, but it is doubtful that there is enough 
for this alone to justify restrictive legislation. Webster has several 
definitions for "coupon." One is "a certificate of interest due ... ," 
but other definitions are "a section, as of a ticket or certificate, show-
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ing the holder to be entitled to some service or right," "a certificate 
given with a purchase of goods and redeemable in merchandise or 
cash," and "a part of a printed advertisement designed to be cut 
off for use as an order blank." The idea that is common to all these 
definitions is the existence of a physically separable portion of a 
contract that is to be separated and exchanged for something. Thus 
the ordinary usage of the term is wide enough to include use with 
an insurance policy, and it is hard to mount an attack on coupon 
policies merely because of the use of the term "coupon." Of course, 
it is possible to use the term in a context in which it contributes to 
deception, but this is probably no more true than with most other 
words. 
Since there seems to be no legitimate objection to coupons based 
on terminology alone, let us consider the way in which they are 
used. Although there is little criticism of high-savings insurance 
policies when considered as commodities available for people who 
want them, there is much criticism of the widespread sale of high-
savings policies. It comes in part from competitors, such as the 
sellers of mutual fund shares, and in part from less interested ob-
servers. Such criticism depends in essence upon the propositions that 
(1) for most insurance buyers the quantity of insurance protection 
they actually need can be afforded only if they minimize immediate 
drain on income through the use of term insurance or a combina-
tion of term and ordinary life insurance, while (2) for buyers who 
have income left for saving after buying adequate life insurance 
protection the rate of return on savings in life insurance policies is 
relatively low, and a better return can be obtained with reasonable 
safety by investing in mutual funds or in other ways, and (3) that 
these facts, or alleged facts, are not generally known to prospective 
buyers of insurance and it is to the interest of the sellers of high-
savings policies to keep them from being known. In essence, then, 
the objection to the high-savings insurance policy is that it is sold 
to people who would be better off with something else, but do not 
realize it. The arguments thus made apply not only to coupon 
policies but also, though in lesser measure, to many policies of 
conservative insurance companies, whether participating or non-
participating. The argument is often persuasively made and prob-
ably has considerable merit. It hardly seems doubtful that many 
insurance buyers would be better off with more insurance protec-
tion and a smaller commitment to savings in the form of life in-
surance. But it is a long step from this conclusion to an argument 
for control or prohibition of high-savings insurance. In a free so-
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ciety in which the state does not assume the duty and the preroga-
tive of telling citizens what they should buy, it is hard to advocate 
with justification the control or prohibition of a commodity that 
is not harmful in itself and that has a beneficial use. Indeed, it 
should not be done because of a mere possibility of sale to persons 
who should not buy, but should be done only if there is misrep-
resentation and misunderstanding in enough cases to create a 
serious problem requiring control by public agencies. Substantial 
possibility of misrepresentation and misunderstanding is necessary 
to justify concern about the use of coupon policies. Two aspects of 
the typical coupon policy seem to make it peculiarly susceptible to 
misrepresentation. One is in the form of the policy-the coupon 
itself, and the other is the usual failure to separate the cost of the 
coupons from the cost of the basic policy, which leads to the obscur-
ing of information about cost. 
The form of the coupon policy facilitates misrepresentation be-
cause of its similarity to the coupon that represents interest or 
profits. One sales presentation included the following statement: 
"Here is a page of coupons .... They are colored green to look like 
money because they actually represent money . . . . [T]here are 
several things you can do with your coupons. You can clip these out 
upon maturity, just like in a bond and exchange them for cash."164 
Salesmen frequently tell prospects that coupon policies are bonds, 
securities, investments and so forth.165 Possible misconception is 
furthered by the pains taken to make the coupons a prominent 
and attractive part of the policy. 
"The coupons are devised to give the appearance of the in-
terest coupons that are frequently attached to investment 
bonds. Although the face amount of the coupon benefit is 
essentially a refund of premium previously paid by a policy-
holder, it is frequently represented that it is the earnings or 
return on the investment of the policyholder in life insur-
ance."166 
Either express or implied reference is thus made to returns from 
stocks, bonds or savings accounts. The fact that the words "profit" 
or "investment" are absent from the coupons and the clauses of 
the contract dealing with the coupons does not preclude them from 
misleading applicants on many occasions: 
164 From our files. Compare the introductory sales presentation, note I supra. 
105 See, e.g., letter from Carl Stumer, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance of South 
Dakota, to Charles Manson, "Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance, Nov. 30, 1961. 
106 Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962). 
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"To print the coupon in the color and format of interest 
coupons commonly attached to investment bonds disguises 
the true nature of the product being purchased by the public. 
A series of one year endowments affords a special type of bene-
fit which the average life insurance buyer would seldom pur-
chase if he were in possession of the full information concern-
ing the premiums paid for the pure endowment benefits 
provided."167 
The use of a passbook instead of coupons may make the form some-
what less objectionable, but probably not decisively so, for pass-
books, too, suggest earnings rather than a refund of an overcharge. 
In another respect the form of the coupon policy may facilitate 
deception, or may itself deceive. It is normal for a coupon policy 
to contain only nineteen coupons, the first coupon being payable 
at the time the second annual premium is paid, and one being pay-
able at the corresponding time each year thereafter, up to the 
twentieth premium payment. There is none associated with the first 
premium. The shortage of one coupon is of course quite obvious 
to any one who takes the trouble to examine the policy carefully, 
but it is not pointed out and may be the basis for misunderstanding 
in the case of the unsophisticated applicant. The absence of a 
coupon corresponding to the first premium is related to cost of 
acquisition, i.e., the sum goes to help pay the heavy first year ac-
quisition costs and especially the agent's commission. One actuary 
expressed his dislike for the nineteen coupon arrangement as fol-
lows: 
"If the agent in his presentation said that . . . they were only 
going to give you nineteen coupons and that the first coupon 
they were going to keep to build the agency force on, you 
might go along with that. Then you would know exactly what 
you are getting. Of course, that is never divulged to the ap-
plicant. "1611 
Of course a perceptive insurance buyer would realize the facts, but 
many are not perceptive. 
The probable rejoinder of the coupon-issuing company is not 
without relevance. It would point out that the policyholder who 
buys ordinary insurance from a conservative company is not told 
that he gets no cash value during his first year or even during his 
167 See note appended to Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962). 
168 This was a statement made in discussion by David C. Silletto, Assistant Secretary, 
Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., Fort Wayne, Ind., 1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE 
OF AaruARIES IN PUBUC PRAcnCE 58. 
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second year, because the first year's premium goes in large part to 
pay an agent's commission and other acquisition expenses. This 
is true, but the fact that the deceptive possibility is to some extent 
common to all insurance policies and all companies should not lead 
us to obscure it when we discuss the problems associated with 
coupon policies. We deal here with coupon policies, not because 
they pose the only problems that exist in the marketing of life in-
surance, but because the problems which they create are more 
serious and difficult than those of more traditional forms of cover-
age. 
In some policies, the coupon matures at the end rather than at 
the beginning of the policy year, with the first coupon maturing 
only after the policy has been in effect for two years. Since the 
policyholder pays his premium at the beginning of the year, if he 
dies or lapses during the year, he forfeits the coupon benefit for 
which he has already paid. The same thing would be true in any 
year of the first twenty. This is a minor problem of the kind which 
led, many decades ago, to the enactment of nonforfeiture laws. 
More important than the misleading aspects of the form, how-
ever, is the usual failure to disclose cost information about the 
coupon. Ordinarily the cost of the coupon is not stated separately; 
only the total premium is announced to the applicant. Nor is it 
possible to ascertain the cost of the coupon by examining the con-
tract, even with great care. In a recent Wisconsin Insurance Depart-
ment hearing, on cross-examination the following exchange took 
place between the witness, a distinguished professor testifying on 
behalf of an insurance company issuing coupon policies, and the 
attorney for the Wisconsin Association of Life Underwriters: 
Q. "Is it possible to scan a contract and determine the cost of 
the coupon?" 
A. "No." 
Q. "So that the buyer of the insurance couldn't by reading 
his contract know how much he is paying for the election 
of that contract other than coupons, and how much he is 
paying for the coupons?" 
A. "I think that is correct, yes."169 
100 See Hearing Before the Wis. Dept. of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 65 
ijan. 1962). Some efforts at ascertaining cost information may be found in Reply Memo-
randum, Wis. Ass'n of Life Underwriters and Wis. Life Convention to the Wisconsin 
Insurance Department, In the matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed Rule Ins. 
2.08 of the Wisconsin Adm. Code, pp. 18-23. One cannot use the results with confidence, 
but the figures are suggestive. See also Reply Brief of General Life Ins. Corp., pp. 7-9. 
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At the same hearing, a spokesman for the department stated that 
"it is doubtful that many policyholders [of coupon policies] under-
stand the premium which they pay at the beginning of the year 
contains a charge to provide the funds from which the coupon can 
be paid by the company at the end of the year."170 Inability to learn 
the price of the coupon prevents the applicant from comparing the 
cost of the benefit with its value. Indeed, the agent may allow the 
policyholder to infer, may suggest, or may even affirmatively repre-
sent to the prospect, that the whole face value of the coupon repre-
sents a return on investment, instead of a return of investment. 
Even if the agent does not so misrepresent, there is a substantial 
likelihood of this misunderstanding. If, for example, the gross an-
nual premium is $100.00 the face value of the coupon is $10.00 and 
the cost of the coupon $9.70, then the actual return on the amount 
invested in the coupon is about three percent, but since the face 
value of the coupon is ten percent of the gross premium, the policy-
holder may think he is getting a ten percent return. This miscon-
ception is made possible by the failure to state separately on the 
face of the policy the amount of the premium allocated to the 
coupon. 
The possibility that a policyholder will misunderstand the 
nature of a coupon policy is increased by the varied benefits that 
are contained in many coupon policies. Though the four basic 
options generally available are familiar in connection with ordinary 
dividends on orthodox policies, coupon policies seem to have 
greater variability. Additional options are also possible. One policy 
contains a sweeping fifth option that permits the policyholder to 
use, transfer, or assign the coupon to anyone for any purpose he 
may designate. In fact, that company expected to encourage the 
policyholder to transfer the coupon to a specified stockbroker on 
a regular basis for the purchase of common stocks. These options 
may make the coupon policy difficult enough to compare with 
more orthodox policies, and the addition of other specialty fea-
tures, without any specification of the separate premiums attribut-
able to each one, makes the task of comparing prices even more 
tricky. 
In the nature of things, the coupon benefit is merely a refund 
of principal paid in by the policyholder, augmented by interest and 
reduced by any expenses that are charged to the coupons. In the 
first years, the actual cumulative return is markedly less than the 
170 Rearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08, p. 18 Qan. 1962). 
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cumulative total of premiums because of acquisition costs. The 
fact that no coupon is associated with the first-year premium is elo-
quent testimony to this proposition. Until after a number of years, 
the exact number depending on company and policy, there is a net 
loss for the policyholder, even without taking interest into account. 
If interest earnings are to be considered, the coupon policy method 
proves to be an inefficient way to save money. The coupon company 
may justifiably reply that the same thing is true of the cash values 
and dividends of the orthodox insurer, but, as before, we should 
not ignore disadvantages and problems inherent in the coupon 
policy merely because the same problems and disadvantages exist 
in lesser measure in the orthodox policy. The greater problem 
should be dealt with before the lesser, for there is less justifica-
tion for legal intervention in connection with the latter. 
Some conservative life insurance men have put the case against 
coupons very strongly. Thus one actuary, a spokesman for a large 
life insurance company, said: 
"I think the problems with the so-called coupon policies have 
resulted purely from the merchandising of them. I was once 
talking to a man who was a very successful merchandiser of 
special policies .... He told me, further, that there were two 
reasons for their success. The first was that the coverage was 
easy to misrepresent by the agent. I think that is true. Second, 
he said that many of the provisions of the policy had been 
deliberately designed to give the prospect ... the impression 
that he is taking advantage of the life insurance com-
pany .... "111 
There is no practicable way to ascertain the extent to which 
coupons are the basis of misrepresentation, just as there is no prac-
ticable way to measure the extent of deception in the marketing 
of the more traditional policies of insurance. It is hard to doubt, 
however, that there is more deception in connection with coupon 
policies, and possibly a great deal more. Coupons are not added 
because they are needed to make the insurance policy meet a need, 
but rather they are added because they help to sell despite a higher 
price. For the most part, the companies issuing coupon policies 
are rather new companies which need sales gimmicks, and there is 
a tendency for them to become more conservative as they become 
better established.172 Under the circumstances it would be surpris-
171 1960-1961 PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 58. 
172 See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
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ing if there were not more misrepresentation than with traditional 
policies. 
It seems reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the available 
evidence, that the misrepresentation problem is serious enough in 
the coupon policy that it should be subjected to control, if control 
without excessive adverse collateral consequences is possible. 
B. The Regulation of Coupon Policies 
l. Prohibition 
The simplest way to control coupon policies is to forbid them. 
That solution has appealed to a number of legislatures and insur-
ance departments when they have been led to take action. As early 
as 1913 the Minnesota legislature prohibited coupon policies.178 
In more recent years, other legislatures and state insurance depart-
ments have adopted a similar policy.174 
One of the consequences of outright prohibition is loss of what-
ever advantages are offered by the coupon policy. It seems useful 
to examine the advantages claimed for such contracts, to see 
whether there would be a serious loss to the public if they were kept 
off the market. The chief advantage urged by the proponents of 
coupon policies is flexibility in working out an insurance program. 
That flexibility comes from the options available in connection 
with the coupon, which are basically the same as the standard 
dividend options available from most participating companies.175 
The flexibility provided by the coupon policies can thus be attained 
through ordinary participating insurance without the disadvan-
tages of the coupons. The coupons offer only a guaranteed savings 
component. Even the supporters of the coupon policy say little 
more than that. One coupon company stated that the coupon "is 
merely a convenience to the insured in his use of the pure endow-
ment feature provided by the policy."176 If it is merely a conveni-
ence, it should not be purchased at too high a price measured in 
potential misrepresentation and misunderstanding. Moreover, 
there is also an element of inflexibility introduced by the coupon. 
The coupons increase the premiums, so that they are large in rela-
tion to insurance protection and thus more difficult for the policy-
holder to maintain except at the cost of using each coupon to 
173 Minn. Laws 1913, ch. 443, § 1, now MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.41 (1945). 
174 See notes 159, 160 supra. 
175 See NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, WHO WRITES WHAT 222-33 (1962). 
176 Brief for F.L. Ins. Co., In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed 
Ins. Rule 2.08 of the Wis. Adm. Code, p. 5 (1962). 
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reduce premiums. But if they are thus used, they add net cost to 
the policy without any corresponding benefit, since the first year 
commission on a coupon policy is higher than on a similar policy 
without coupons because of the higher gross premiums.177 
Despite the fact that the coupon policy offers no significant 
advantage over other available policies, and despite the fact that 
it is more susceptible to misrepresentation than traditional policies, 
one should be cautious about prohibiting it. Prohibition requires 
a judgment that the potential harm from coupon policies is sub-
stantial. Not only may such policies offer some advantages to an 
occasional buyer under certain circumstances, but we should start 
with a substantial bias against interfering with freedom of contract, 
which is one of the prime values of our legal system. Indeed, it can 
be said quite categorically that a heavy burden rests on anyone 
who proposes to interfere with the making of contracts as negotiat-
ing parties wish to make them. Freedom to make one's own judg-
ments about his contracts is an important value, even if the freedom 
will sometimes be used foolishly. The fact that the advantages of 
coupon policies are slight and that they involve a serious danger 
of misunderstanding justifies outright prohibition only if it is not 
possible to make them inoffensive in some less drastic manner. 
2. Disclosure 
The most objectionable aspect of the coupon policy is not its 
form, but the failure to disclose cost. The companies issuing coupon 
policies surely work out the premium charges by making separate 
computations for coupons and for insurance. If so, they can easily 
disclose the charges separately. The only obvious reason for nondis-
closure would be to mislead the policyholder, or at least to permit 
him to mislead himself. An assertion that the public interest re-
quires a full and fair disclosure of coupon costs to the policyholder 
is hard to answer. Of course, disclosure may make it more difficult 
for the company to make an attractive sales presentation, for aware-
ness of the actual cost of the coupon would at once dispel all illu-
sions of a high rate of return on the initial investment. The nature 
of the coupon as an endowment, or savings account, would at once 
become apparent, with a drastic reduction in its marketing appeal. 
177 See Memorandum to the Subcommittee on Reserves and Nonforfeiture Values 
and Related Matters of Coupon and Similar Policies, June 16, 1963, by Earl Nicholson, 
Actuary and Deputy Ins. Comm'r of Nevada. But see Reply Brief for G. L. Ins. Corp., 
In the Matter of Consideration of Adoption of Proposed Rule Ins. 2.08 of the Wis. Adm. 
Code, p. 7 (1962). 
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As the Wisconsin Department said, "A series of one-year endow-
ments affords a special type of benefit which the average life in-
surance buyer would seldom purchase if he were in possession of 
the full information concerning the premiums paid for the pure 
endowment benefits provided."178 But it is hardly an appealing 
argument against a disclosure requirement that the prospect is less 
likely to buy if he knows the truth. 
The coupon company may retort that it is unfair to compel dis-
closure of the cost of the coupon if you do not also compel partici-
pating companies to disclose the extent to which their premiums 
exceed those of nonparticipating companies, i.e., the cost of their 
dividends. There is some merit in the argument, but some weak-
nesses also. First, the coupon is a guaranteed dividend, and thus 
clearly separable from the rest of the policy, whereas ordinary 
dividends come from the residue of the premium which is left after 
paying losses and expenses, and cannot be estimated with complete 
accuracy. Second, the nature of the ordinary dividend is fairly well 
known, and apart from misleading statements occasionally made 
about the size of future dividends by unscrupulous salesmen, 
policyholders generally do not suppose that the dividends of par-
ticipating companies constitute profits. It is not necessary to dis-
abuse them of their illusions, since they have none. This is not to 
say that there may not be room for more disclosure in connection 
with other insurance as well, but only that the problem is less 
serious than with coupon policies, and that one should deal with 
the more serious problems first. 
Even disclosure has been traditionally beyond the scope of 
normal state intervention in contracts. However, there has been 
a growing feeling that it is legitimate for the state to compel full 
disclosure in connection with any contract where people are apt 
to be deceived. There is less need to prohibit contracts or control 
their terms if only the truth is made known. The general disclosure 
policy of the securities and investment legislation of Congress il-
lustrates the tendency.179 Moreover, and more important, the phil-
osophy underlying the insurance codes would seem to dictate the 
disclosure of the amount charged for the coupon benefit. The whole 
insurance business is operated in full public view. Insurance stat-
178 See authority cited note 167 supra. 
179 President Kennedy's special message to Congress of March 15, 1962, also expressed 
a disclosure philosophy: "Under our system, consumers have a right to expect that pack• 
ages will carry reliable and readily usable information about their contents," N.Y. Times, 
March 16, 1962, p. 16, col. 8. 
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utes have created machinery to make a public record of the costs 
of the various components of insurance policies in nearly all fields. 
Several states require companies to keep separate accounts for, and 
to set forth in annual statements the gains and losses arising from, 
participating and nonparticipating business. Some insurance de-
partments are now trying, through the Blanks Committee of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, to secure an 
amendment to the nationally used annual statement blank to re-
quire submission of a separate gain and loss exhibit for participat-
ing and nonparticipating business.180 But more explicitly, such 
statutory provisions as the following require disclosure of the kind 
with which this section is concerned: 
"No figures used in any statement or illustration of future 
dividends or of future net cost shall be issued or, used by any 
company or agent, unless the same shall be a mathematical cal-
culation based upon assumptions of the policy and dividend 
scale in actual use, nor unless each edition thereof ... has been 
filed with the commissioner."181 
Furthermore, the law requires each policy to meet the standard 
non-forfeiture and valuation requirements.182 This requires that a 
great deal of detailed information be supplied to the regulatory 
authority. Insurance departments examine forms, rates charged, 
non-forfeiture benefits provided, and valuation standards employed 
to determine whether the appropriate requirements have been 
met.183 There is no reason that this comparative cost data should not 
be as fully available to the purchaser as to the insurance depart-
men ts. It would be contrary to the disclosure philosophy that runs 
through the insurance statutes to permit the merging of the pre-
mium charge of components (coupons, life insurance, return of 
premium, etc.) to mask the information the policyholder needs to 
make his judgments informed ones. 
180 The reform is vigorously opposed by some companies and some departments. 
In an April 1963 meeting of the Blanks Committee of the N.A.I.C., a motion to amend 
the annual statement blank to require a separate gain and loss exhibit for participating 
and nonparticipating business lost by an 8-7 vote. See Joint Gen. Bull. No. 1044, June 4, 
1!163, American Life Convention-Life Ins. Ass'n of America. 
181 Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 206.51(2) (1957). 
182 See standard non-forfeiture requirements, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.181 (Supp. 
1962); standard valuation requirements, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.201 (Supp. 1962). 
183 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.17(1) (1957), which provides: "No policy of life .•• 
insurance • • . shall be issued . . . until the commissioner has approved the same 
or until there has been filed with him at least 30 days the form of such policy and a 
copy_ of any
0 
table of rates or statement of benefits furnished to agents or to the 
public •••. 
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But the coupon company may respond that its benefits are so 
variable and so complicated that it is not possible to separate the 
coupon cost from the cost of the regular insurance. If the benefits 
are really so complicated that disclosure of cost is impossible, that 
alone would be a devastating indictment of the policy, and would 
be a strong argument for prohibition. Moreover, there is reason 
to doubt that it would really be so difficult to separate the charges 
if there were a will to do so. 
The case for full disclosure of the cost of coupons is a strong 
one. It might be quite different if the variable benefits represented 
commodities of such special value to the consumer as to justify 
keeping him uninformed, but to state the proposition is to answer 
it. If the components of coupon policies were required to be sim-
plified enough to be priced separately, if terminology were made 
more nearly standard to facilitate understanding, and if full dis-
closure could effectively be compelled, the objectionable aspects 
of the present coupon policies would be largely eliminated without 
any loss to the policyholders, who could still buy any combination 
of savings and insurance they really desired. 
In 1961 the Florida Insurance Department issued a regulation 
that uses the disclosure solution directly, stating that "no coupon 
policy will be approved after this date unless it bears the words on 
the face: 'The premium above includes an extra premium of $ ... 
for coupon benefits.' " The regulation goes on to specify, later, that 
the "statement should be placed in a prominent place on the face 
of the policy, preferably near the premium schedule and should be 
of large type (18 pt. or better).''184 
There are similar regulations in a number of other states.185 
The Wisconsin Insurance Department has interpreted a section of 
the Wisconsin statute as requiring such disclosure with coupon 
policies, though it does not deal explicitly with coupon policies. 
The relevant provisions are as follows: 
"No policy . . . shall be issued . . . unless it contains . . . the 
following provisions: ... Provision 2, specifying separately 
the premium charged for any benefit promised in the policy 
other than life or endowment insurance."186 
Thus when a life or endowment policy carries with it fringe benefits 
such as waiver of premium, accidental death benefit, etc., a separate 
184 Fla. Dep't of Ins. Bull. No. 33, Aug. 8, 1961. 
185 See regulations cited note 161 supra. 
186 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 206.18 (1957). 
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statement of the premium for each additional benefit must be made. 
It has been argued that the words "other than life or endowment 
insurance" require disclosure of no more than the gross premium 
of the coupon policy as a whole, which is a combination life and 
endowment policy. In answer, it has been urged that the true mean-
ing of this provision is apparent only when it is restated: 
"No policy ... shall be issued ... unless it contains ... the 
following provisions: . . . Provision 2, specifying separately 
the premium charged for any benefit promised in the policy 
other than life ... insurance ... [if it is a life insurance 
policy]" 
[and] 
"Provision 2, specifying separately the premium charged for 
any benefit promised in the policy other than ... endowment 
insurance ... [if it is an endowment policy]."187 
According to this view, if an endowment policy is issued, the pre-
miums for benefits in addition to the endowment insurance must 
be separately stated, and if a basic life insurance policy is issued, 
the premiums for benefits in addition to the life insurance must 
be separately stated. It would seem to follow that where a policy 
combines both life and endowment insurance, the separate pre-
mium for each kind of benefit must be separately stated. 
This proposed interpretation appears to have been accepted by 
the Wisconsin Department of Insurance in its promulgation of 
Rule 2.08.188 The rule explicitly forbade the use of coupons. To 
prevent evasion of the regulation by stopping the use of coupons 
and describing the benefits merely as endowments, the depart-
mental statement included this: "Any policy containing a series of 
one-year pure endowments or a series of guaranteed periodic bene-
fits maturing during the premium paying period of the policy .. . 
[must state what] the premium charged for such benefits shall be .. . 
without deception or misrepresentation." 
The disclosure approach seems to provide a direct and simple 
method of regulation, and therefore seems at first to be a plausible 
solution to the problem. It has the great advantage that it preserves 
a large measure of freedom to contract, subject only to the require-
ment of truth in the sales presentation. However, it also presents 
some problems. 
187 This construction of the statute was suggested in the Reply Brief for Wis. Life 
Convention, pp. 14-15, filed for Hearing Before the Wis. Dep't of Ins. on Proposed Rule 
Ins. 2.08 ijan. 1962). 
188 See Wis. Adm. Code section Ins. 2.08 (1962). 
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The most important defect in the disclosure approach, if dis-
closure is required merely in the policy, is that most agents never 
use the policy form in making the sales presentation. Even those 
who do now use it could discontinue doing so in order to avoid 
the embarrassment of making the disclosure. Information on the 
face of the policy thus would be of little aid to the applicant before 
he makes his decision to purchase. When he reads the policy it is 
too late. Moreover, few buyers of life insurance ever examine an 
insurance policy and, of those who do, not many are sufficiently 
sophisticated to appreciate the implications of what they see. The 
insurance business and the insurance policy are too complex. 
A possible remedy for the foregoing weakness of the disclosure 
approach is to require the agent to make an affirmative disclosure 
of separate cost data in the sales presentation, whether he uses the 
policy or not. But to see that this is done would pose a difficult prob-
lem of regulation. To see that it is fully done, and fairly done, 
would he beyond the financial resources of the most affluent insur-
ance department. 
Even if the policy were required to he used, or in fact were used, 
in the sales presentation, and even if it did contain a full disclosure 
of relevant cost information, there is still no assurance that the total 
impact of the presentation, in context, would not be seriously mis-
leading. There still is no assurance that the prospect will have the 
ability to assimilate and use all of the data that is presented to him, 
usually presented very rapidly in an interview filled with many 
subtle pressures. These considerations lead to doubt whether the 
disclosure approach provides sufficient protection to the public to 
make it adequate. There is no doubt, however, that a requirement 
of disclosure both in the policy and in the sales presentation is a 
minimum requirement for decent protection of the public against 
easily perpetrated and highly probable misrepresentations in con-
nection with coupon policies. 
3. Control of Representations 
A method of control that has some elements both of disclosure 
and of prohibition is the effort to prohibit in a discriminating way 
certain kinds of statements in connection with the marketing of 
coupon policies. There might he an effort, for example, to prohibit 
reference to "profits" or to "income in investment" in connection 
with coupons. This is the thrust of a 1959 ruling by the Indiana In-
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surance Department.189 Illinois Department of Insurance Rule 
9.09, section 5(g), forbids and makes unlawful the "stating or imply-
ing that the principal amounts payable under coupons represent in-
terest, earnings, return on investment, or anything other than bene-
fits the cost of which is included in the total premium."19O This is an 
effort to take all the objectionable features out of the coupon policy 
and its marketing, without prohibiting it altogether. The greatest 
difficulty which is apparent in such proposals is the difficulty of 
policing such prohibitions, because of the large number of synony-
mous expressions that need to be anticipated and proscribed. If the 
prohibition were couched in general language, it would have the 
disadvantage of all penal legislation which does not accurately ap-
prise the citizen of the forbidden conduct. If it is made specific, it 
must be encyclopedic to catch everything, and then is unlikely to 
be sufficiently discriminating for the reason that the use of par-
ticular words or phrases is less important than the whole context of 
the sales presentation. Moreover, if there is any legitimate use for 
the coupon policies, it is in the public interest to permit an effective 
sales presentation, so long as it is consistent with the truth. Unless 
a more discriminating and skillfully drafted proposal is presented 
than any yet made public, such an approach is probably fore-
doomed to failure. Moreover, even adequate and well articulated 
standards do not solve the problem of enforcement; this is the kind 
of enforcement which is difficult or even impossible. 
Prohibition of coupon policies has some obvious advantages 
over the other methods of control. It would be almost completely 
effective. The insurance department must approve all policies be-
fore they can be issued. Issuance of a coupon policy that does not 
have approval from the department would lead to license revoca-
tion; enforcement would be as simple as that. But the more subtle 
methods of control present difficult enforcement problems. Com-
plaints must be investigated, hearings held, and difficult statutory 
or regulatory standards applied. This takes more time, men, and 
180 See Ind. Dep't of Ins. Reg., Dec. 16, 1959, which says, "Coupons are not to be 
referred to in any manner as 'profits' or 'income' in investment." 
100 Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 5(9), Oct. 31, 1962. In its proposed form this sec-
tion prohibited "stating or implying that the principal amounts payable under coupons 
or as endowments represent interest, earnings, return on investment, or anything other 
than benefits the cost of which is included in the total premium." Proposed Rule 9.09, 
§ 17. (Emphasis added.) The rule as adopted eliminates the italicized words, giving rise to 
the possibility of achieving the same thing in another form (i.e., guaranteed annual 
dividend payments). 
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money than are available to most departments. Under such a 
system, even departments with sufficient resources can provide pro- · 
tection only to policyholders who complain. Ferreting out viola-
tions without a complaint as a starting point would be an impossible 
task. Thus only persons who complain will receive redress; those 
who are not sufficiently discerning to appreciate that there is a 
basis for complaint will have no protection. All this argues strongly 
for prohibition as the only really effective remedy. Against this 
must be balanced the advantages of coupon policies, which are 
slight, and the value of freedom of contract, which is substantial. 
But the value of freedom of contract is not one that can never be 
overridden; there seems ample justification here for subjecting it 
to the pursuit of fairness in the insurance transaction. 
As suggested earlier, the passbook form is little less objection-
able than the coupon form. The New Jersey Department of Bank-
ing and Insurance, with what seems sufficient justification, has ob-
jected to the use of a passbook in connection with coupon or 
guaranteed endowment policies since the book 
"in itself is likely to create the impression ... that the trans-
action is one where the premium deposits will be returned in 
full, with interest, in a manner similar to that where money 
is put in a savings deposit in a bank. Actually, however, the 
transaction is primarily in the nature of insurance and the 
amount returned to the insured in the event of surrender or 
lapse may be very much less than the premiums paid in alone 
without any interest."191 
Consequently the New Jersey Department prohibits the use of 
passbooks.192 
Whether or not it is concluded that coupon policies should be 
prohibited, or permitted only with full disclosure of the cost in-
formation that would make comparison possible, there is enough 
danger of misrepresentation and misunderstanding to justify addi-
tional effort in policing the marketing process. Special attention 
should be given by complaint bureaus within insurance depart-
101 N.J. Dep't of Banking and Ins. Reg. I-1963A-2, July 15, 1963. 
192 Ibid. Other states have also shown awareness of misuse of the savings account 
idea, e.g., the Ill. Dep't of Ins. Rule 9.09, § 4(10), Oct. 31, 1962, prohibits "describing 
premium payments in language which states the payment is a 'deposit' • • • .'' Some 
states follow the Mo. Div. of Ins. Order No. Ill-9, ,r l(d), Jan. 19, 1962, which pro• 
hibits "references to premiums as 'deposits' in such a manner as to lead the prospective 
policyholder to believe that they create a fund which is withdrawable without reference 
to the cash surrender or loan provisions of the policy . • • ." 
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ments to ferreting out and punishing misrepresentation by agents 
for coupon companies. A previous article has shown how difficult 
this task is, and there should be no expectation of great success from 
it.193 It would require no new legislation, for every state seems al-
ready to have a statute broad enough to meet the need,1°4 but what 
is needed instead is larger, more competent, and better-financed 
complaint bureaus. 
VII. ADDITIONAL SPECIALTY FEATURES AND COMBINATIONS 
A. Miscellaneous Specialty Provisions 
Three additional specialty features are common enough to be 
discussed in this paper.195 One is the "return of premium" provi-
sion, which promises to pay to the beneficiary, in addition to the 
face amount of the policy, all premiums paid to the time of the 
insured's death. It applies only in case the insured dies within a 
specified period from the execution of the policy; permanent cover-
age of this kind would be actuarially impossible. This is merely 
increasing term insurance. The "return of cash value" provision is 
similar to the "return of premium" provision, the only difference 
being that the measure of the benefit is the cash value of the policy 
at the time of death rather than the premiums paid. It, too, is in-
creasing term insurance. The "sight draft" or "immediate cash 
draft" provision is a feature promising to pay the beneficiary a 
percentage of the face value of the policy if the insured dies before 
103 Kimball &: Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 
141 (1961). 
10¼ Section 3(a) of the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act provides that "no person 
engaged in the business of insurance in this state shall make, issue, or circulate, or cause 
to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, or statement of any 
sort misrepresenting the terms of any policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or 
advantages promised thereby, or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received 
thereon, or shall use any name or title of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting 
the true nature thereof," and section 3(b) provides that "no person engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance in this state shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before 
the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated 
or placed before the public, in a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a 
notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio station, or in any other 
way, an advertisement, announcement or statement of any sort containing any assertion, 
representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to 
any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive, or mis• 
leading." For a discussion of the Model Act, see note 94 supra. 
105 "These plans are usually on some basic life plan or contain a unique investment 
fund, supplemented by level, increasing, or maybe decreasing term, sometimes with frills 
of coupons and return premium benefits added which preclude any cost comparison." 
1957-1958 PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBUC PRACTICE 56. 
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the lapse of a specified period, typically twenty years. Actuarially 
this is merely level term insurance, but it has some obvious ad-
vantages; it is usually paid without formality and very quickly and 
thus is useful to pay the expenses of last illness and death. In fact, a 
part of its attractiveness is that it is often attached to the policy in 
the form of a sight draft, as its name suggests. The draft may be 
taken to a financial institution and presumably will be paid with 
a minimum of formalities. 
There is nothing inherent in the nature of any of these three 
coverages that is objectionable. The first two are merely increasing 
term insurance; the third is level term insurance. It is hard to see 
why most people would need or want increasing term, since decreas-
ing term corresponds more often to real financial needs. But it is 
not objectionable, even if it may not be adapted to most people's 
requirements. Clearly, however, none of these coverages add any-
thing to the insurance market that is not otherwise obtainable. 
Their elimination would detract not at all from the usefulness 
of the insurance institution. The only question for us is whether 
the way in which these coverages are used is so misleading that they 
should be prohibited or otherwise controlled, not because they are 
inherently evil but because the abuses cannot otherwise be pre-
vented. 
The return of premium provision and the cash value provision 
are attached to policies in that form mainly because they facilitate 
a certain kind of sales argument. The introduction to this essay 
presented an illustration of the way in which these arguments are 
phrased. These forms of coverage are objectionable because they 
can very easily be used to facilitate misrepresentation and fraud 
in the sale of the policy by making misleading comparisons with 
traditional forms. 
The sight draft provision is less objectionable. It is difficult 
to see how it can be the subject of misrepresentation, except perhaps 
as it leads to inaccurate imputations of delay in payment by other 
insurance companies. However, this kind of misrepresentation is 
easily possible with ordinary insurance policies and it is doubtful 
if the sight draft provision is any more likely to be thus misrepre-
sented than other coverages. Thus there seems to be no sound 
objection to any of these three coverages as such, but there is a 
serious objection in the ordinary use of the first two, for they 
encourage unfair and misleading comparisons with other, more 
traditional policies. They contribute nothing of value to the in-
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surance market and they facilitate misrepresentation. Actually it 
is hard to object to the issuance of increasing term insurance, eo 
nomine. It is the use of the terms "return of premium" and "cash 
value" that facilitate deception. Perhaps the best the law can do 
here without unduly interfering with freedom of contract is to 
forbid the use of these and similar terms which lend themselves to 
sharp selling practices. There seems to be no justification for pro-
hibition of the sight draft provision at all. 
Perhaps one additional provision can properly be dealt with as 
a "specialty" provision. That is a provision for the future increase 
of benefits. A New Jersey department release speaks of policies 
"where the sum insured after ten or twenty years is trebled."196 
This specialty does not seem seriously objectionable on the ground 
that it facilitates misrepresentation, or other unfair practices, but 
it does enable the issuing company to evade statutory limitations 
on first-year expenses. It should probably be forbidden on that 
ground alone. 
B. Combinations of Provisions 
Thus far this section and earlier sections have dealt with the 
merits and demerits of the various features separately. However, 
almost invariably two or more features are presented at once. This 
is especially true with respect to the coverages now under discus-
sion. They rarely exist alone. If any specialty feature is subject to 
condemnation when it is considered separately, a fortiori it should 
be condemned when it is combined with any other that is also of 
doubtful value. Moreover, a feature that is not itself objectionable 
may become so because of the cumulative impact of a number of 
of features. A specialty company may issue a policy combining the 
coupon, charter, profit sharing, return of premium, and sight draft 
features. Such a combination has two functions from the point of 
view of the company. First, the cumulation of specialty features 
adds to the marketing appeal. The more advantages about which 
the prospect can be told, the more likely he is to buy. In the sales 
presentation with which this essay began, the impact of the cumula-
tion of various features may be seen. Though not every policy con-
tains all of the features, some contain almost all of them. In any 
event cumulation is important in most specialty policies. 
The second function of the cumulation of specialty features, 
from the point of view of the company issuing the policy, is 
100 N.J. Proposed Reg. No. I-1963A-l, pp. 1-2. 
250 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
the obstruction of meaningful cost comparisons. The premium 
is lumped together into a singte gross premium with no indica-
tion of the separate cost of each feature. Certainly the actuaries 
for the company can separate the charges. Indeed, it would 
be irresponsible for an actuary to set a premium for such 
a package without arriving at it on the basis of careful computa-
tions for each individual component. The cost of conventional 
life insurance undoubtedly constitutes the greatest portion of the 
premium in most specialty policies. A charge for the coupon bene-
fit is then added; the latter may be constant or may vary from year 
to year according to some formula. Finally, on top of the premium 
for these two features will be a charge for the level or increasing 
term insurance in the form of the specialties dealt with here. These 
may be combined in a variety of ways, so that it becomes impossible 
to make a fair comparison of the price of a complicated specialty 
policy with that of conventional insurance issued by one of the 
more conservative companies. 
It is usually possible to make a meaningful comparison between 
policies issued by different companies when the form of the insur-
ance is roughly comparable. Of course, it is difficult for the average 
insured to make such a comparison himself but he can have it made 
for him by an insurance counselor. In any event, he can depend 
upon agents to explain, so far as possible, the advantages and dis-
advantages of the policies issued by competing companies. How-
ever, when a complicated specialty policy is to be compared with 
conventional insurance, the comparison becomes extremely dif-
ficult and therefore meaningless to the ordinary policyholder. 
The combination of the premiums into a single premium is 
done deliberately in order to preclude cost comparisons. The life 
insurance market is fiercely competitive on the price level, and 
new, small companies tend to seek protection from the full force 
of the competition. 
Earlier in this article an effort was made to decide just how 
objectionable each specialty feature is and to make recommenda-
tions for its prohibition, its control, or for the neutrality of the law 
with respect to it. At this point some conclusions must be added on 
the combination of specialty features, for although the article has 
generally suggested stringent control measures or even prohibition, 
its suggestions will not necessarily prevail. On the whole, perhaps 
the best solution to the problem presented by combinations of 
specialty features is to treat each feature separately when consider-
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ing whether to prohibit it or merely to regulate it. The significantly 
distinctive factor here is the combination of charges in a lump sum. 
It seems to be very important to prevent the concealment of the 
separate cost of each feature, and thereby to enable the policy-
holder to make cost comparisons. This is no less true because most 
policyholders are incapable of making such comparisons or will not 
take the trouble to do so. At least comparison should be made pos-
sible. For combinations, therefore, even if a decision is made not 
to control or prohibit the component parts, the law should at least 
require a separate statement of the cost of each feature. This should 
create no real difficulties for specialty companies other than to 
make sales presentations somewhat less effective. But the diminu-
tion in effectiveness will result from the decreased ease of mis-
representation or misleading statements; hence this diminished 
impact can be no proper objection to this control device. Although 
it is possible to argue that some combinations ought to be pro-
hibited even when the component parts need not be, it would 
generally be so difficult to devise rules to handle such problems 
appropriately and without unnecessary prohibitions that the solu-
tion to combinations should be couched in terms of the separation 
of charges only. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The subject of this article is a fast-moving and timely field 
in which noteworthy developments will undoubtedly appear in 
the interval between the completion of the writing and its pub-
lication. Indeed, between the time the body of the article was 
finished and the writing of this concluding section, an important 
event has served to underscore this point. This occurrence was the 
action taken by the Ohio Insurance Department to stop the use of 
a chain letter system for the merchandising of life insurance poli-
cies.107 If A, having first purchased a particular policy, induces B 
to buy one also, then A receives a bonus of 150 dollars. If B then in-
duces C to purchase one, A gets fifty dollars. Finally, if C induces 
D to purchase, A gets twenty-five dollars. Meanwhile, B and C re-
ceive their turns at the larger sums. Obviously the first year pre-
mium has to include an additional amount of approximately 250 
197 See J. of Commerce, June 12, 1963, p. 8, cols. 6•7. Even more recently, a "new 
plan to lease life insurance" has been announced. J. of Commerce, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 8; 
Ins. Advocate, Sept. 14, 1963, p. 38. 
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dollars to pay these bonuses. The Ohio Department castigated the 
plan as a system of rebates, but perhaps it is more nearly akin to the 
profit-sharing or charter policies heretofore discussed. In any case, 
there seems little doubt that the practice is objectionable and that 
the Ohio Department was justified in its suppression. 
The changeable character of the field emphasizes the difficulty 
of dealing with it adequately. For example, if coupon policies are 
forbidden eo nomine, they merely become pass book policies, or 
guaranteed dividend policies; with abandonment of the form of 
coupons the prohibition becomes ineffective. While abolition of 
the coupons does in fact eliminate some of the difficulty, it does 
not eliminate all of it. Any statutes or regulations developed to 
treat these problems must contemplate the probability of con-
stantly evolving forms, or at least terminology, even if the reality 
behind the form remains much the same. 
The number of distinct specialty policies that could be formed 
from the various possible permutations and combinations of spe-
cialty features is staggering. For this reason, it would be imprac-
ticable to deal in an article such as this with each specialty policy as 
a whole, though in some measure it is unfair to judge it on any other 
basis. However, the requirements of practicality lead to the separate 
treatment of each specialty feature as if it stood alone, despite the 
fact that it seldom does. By its nature, therefore, this article can be 
only a starting point for discussion, not a blueprint for action. 
Fairness, reasonableness, and equity in the insurance market-
what one might call "purity of the market"-states the approximate 
content of a fundamental goal of insurance law that urges us in 
the direction of close regulation or even of prohibition of the spe-
cialty policies described above. To be weighed against it are the 
values of freedom of contract and freedom of access to the insurance 
market for new companies. The latter are values of considerable 
importance in a free economic system, moving us to caution before 
deciding in favor of intervention in the insurance market. But they 
are not absolute values; it is quite generally agreed at this date that 
they only compel the advocate of intervention to make a case for 
the necessity of proposed action. 
Both of these latter values have their justification largely in 
the economic advantage thought to flow from them. Part of the case 
for intervention in connection with specialty policies lies in the fact 
that the American life insurance market is not in desperate need 
of new company formations. The large number of companies now 
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operating in the United States, and the rapid rate at which the num-
ber has grown in recent decades, suggests that some restriction upon 
access to the market would do no harm and might possibly be desir-
able.108 Restriction can come about through the raising of mini-
mum requirements for entry, especially capital and surplus require-
ments, or it can come about by making the conditions of operation 
in the market less attractive to new companies, such as by restricting 
or prohibiting the kinds of contracts that may be offered for sale. 
If the situation were to change, and the higher standards of morality 
imposed by the law led to a decline in the number of companies 
operating in the market, then a sound public policy might call for 
a relaxation in the terms of access or some other form of encourage-
ment to new enterprise. However, it seems unlikely that even com-
plete abolition of all specialty pqlicies would prevent the formation 
of enough new companies to satisfy our needs. 
Freedom of contract is also to be justified in economic terms, in 
large part. This is expressed by the specialty companies themselves 
when they speak of the desirability of having the "boundaries of 
'public interest' established by policyholder demands and not by 
departmental regulation made without consideration of individual 
or group needs and desires for protection."199 Of course they also 
put their case in more selfish terms when they talk of the right of 
the small companies "to compete freely insofar as [their] conduct 
is not injurious to the public."200 The economic advantage that is 
thought to come from freedom of contract is the development of 
new and better products at lower cost. But so far as cost is con-
cerned, there is now complete freedom to price life insurance at as 
low a level as the individual company can justify, subject only to the 
need to meet the reserve standards set up by law. In fact, the use of 
specialty policies is not aimed at reduction of cost but more fre-
quently at masking an increase in cost so that it will not play its 
accustomed role in a free market. Partly the increase is sought in 
order to provide a larger margin for acquisition costs-mainly the 
108 See Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into 
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471, 514 (1961), for a discussion of the 
"need test" as applied in some European countries. New companies, whether domestic 
or foreign, are simply not admitted to the market in some countries unless there is a 
need for them and the insurance commissioner thinks the market will benefit by their 
presence. While there would be objection to this restriction in the American context, 
it is not unthinkable to close the market to new company formations. It is done in 
some other fields by requiring a "certificate of convenience and necessity" before per-
mitting an entrepreneur to begin business activity. 
100 National Underwriter, Life Ed., Aug. 11, 1962, pp. 15, 21, col. 1. 
200 Ibid. 
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commission of the agent. For instance, one "specialty" that has re-
ceived only casual mention here is the provision of an increased 
face value or other benefit, beginning at some time in the future. 
The New Jersey Insurance Department speaks of policies in which 
the "sum insured after ten or twenty years is trebled."201 Both this 
increase in benefit and the coupon provision enlarge substantially 
the first-year expense allowed under the Standard Nonforfeiture 
Law. 
If the freedom to issue specialty policies produced new and bet-
ter products, that fact would go far to justify their use. On the con-
trary, however, the asserted imagination and aggressiveness of the 
vigorous new companies has not succeeded in producing anything 
really new. The reason is that there is little new to produce; all life 
insurance policies are combinations in varying proportions of pro-
tection and saving. A term insurance policy and a savings account 
can do virtually anything any life insurance policy can do. No spe-
cialty policy discussed here provides anything new enough and 
valuable enough to demonstrate the importance of preserving free-
dom of contract in this market. The situation is quite unlike that 
in fire and casualty insurance, where there have been new develop-
ments of considerable value within recent years. But one must not 
be too dogmatic about this point. The most that can be said with 
assurance is that the particular forms discussed in this article have 
no great value. The way should always be kept open for any really 
new ideas in life insurance. Regulation or prohibition should, 
therefore, be restricted to carefully defined and demonstrably ob-
jectionable contracts. 
It is the necessity of such restriction that makes the task of con-
trol such a difficult one. This article has not discussed the adminis-
trative law problems relating to the competence of the insurance 
department, partly because of their complexity, but also because 
it seems probable that carefully drafted statutes can constitutionally 
give the departments all the power they really need. Because of the 
ingenuity of entrepreneurs, prohibitions or restrictions defined in 
detail in statutes seem unduly cumbersome. Almost inevitably the 
departments must be entrusted with the power to act within broad 
limits. Practically, most departments can do so already. The power 
to require policy forms to be submitted for approval before they can 
be used is not an unlimited power, but for all practical purposes it 
201 N.J. Proposed Reg. No. I-1963A-l, pp. 1-2. 
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enables departments to deny approval on any ground reasonably 
related to the public welfare. Under existing statutes, they can also 
act to forbid a wide variety of marketing practices. 
The commonly used specialty policies all seem objectionable. 
Although the tontine feature does not seem nearly so bad in itself 
as it is often pictured, it makes little contribution to the market and 
could be eliminated without damage to the public. Moreover, it is 
subject to serious abuse, both because of the danger of the dissipa-
tion of the inadequately controlled deferred dividends and because 
of the severe danger of misrepresentation. Profit-sharing and char-
ter policies also encourage serious misrepresentation. Moreover, 
they violate the fundamental public policy in favor of equity in 
insurance pricing, which is also embodied in statutory prescription 
in most states. The coupon policy, too, lends itself to misrepresenta-
tion, especially because of the failure to disclose cost information. 
It would be possible to require that separate cost information be 
provided; theoretically that would be sufficient to prevent the harm 
that arises from the misrepresentation, but as a practical matter it 
would be difficult effectively to police the requirement to see that 
the policyholder had the information at a time sufficiently early to 
make any difference in his decision. The conclusion has thus been 
reached that each of the three major classes of specialty features 
should be abolished. The minor ones-the "return of premium" 
provision-the "return of cash value" provision, and the "sight 
draft" provision, do not seem very dangerous. However, they con-
tribute little that is not already available in the market, if they 
contribute anything at all. Therefore, abolition is a small price to 
pay for the greater purity of the market that would result. The 
ultimate conclusion reached by this study is, therefore, that the 
entire range of specialty policies available in the life insurance 
market, as described herein, are growths of little value that can be 
pruned away without loss to the public. Hopefully this can be 
done without putting the industry in a "strait jacket," as the 
National Association of Life Companies fears. If, after careful de-
finition, the specialty policies are forbidden by name, there should 
be no question of a "strait jacket." If the insurance department re-
mains watchful and ready to extend its prohibited list as new forms 
appear, there is no need for the sweeping prohibition that would 
prevent the development of something new and valuable. The 
only question then is whether a particular form should be on the 
list or not. As it appears in a submitted policy form the question 
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can be decided. Of course this assumes competence in the policy-
examining section, which is not always there. 
Where to draw lines between prohibited and permitted forms 
is a difficult question. It seems clear, for example, that coupons 
'should be prohibited, but it is not obvious that guaranteed divi-
dends should be, or that a series of annual endowments should be. 
But it is not necessary that there be merely a twofold division of the 
field of life insurance between absolutely prohibited and unrestric-
tedly permitted coverages. There can also be, and should be, an 
intermediate area in which coverages are permitted under restric-
tions. For example, guaranteed dividends might be permitted when 
accompanied by a sufficiently clear separate statement of costs. 
If the question were completely new, a forceful argument might 
easily be made that life insurance companies should never have 
become involved in the "banking" business to the extent that they 
have-over 100,000,000,000 dollars. But that decision was made 
long ago and can hardly be considered open at this date. Since all 
legal reserve companies are deeply involved in "banking" already, 
it would be discriminatory to go too far in preventing the slightly 
different forms of "banking" engaged in by coupon companies. 
It is the special danger of misrepresentation, and not objection to 
high savings policies per se, that justifies the prohibition of cou-
pons. However, there seems to be no sound argument whatever 
against a requirement that costs be disclosed as fully as is practicable 
under the circumstances. To the insistence of coupon companies 
that it is unfair for them to be required to disclose separate costs if 
participating companies are not also required to separate the cost 
of the policy from the excess in the premium from which dividends 
are paid, it can be answered that such a disclosure would un-
doubtedly be desirable and quite possibly should be compelled if 
a formula can be devised under which it can practically be accom-
plished. But that is the subject of another article, not of this one; 
more important problems should be solved before spending time 
and effort on less important ones. 
The danger most apparent in the specialty provisions is that 
of misrepresentation. A number of states have sought to control 
the misrepresentation while continuing to permit the coverage. 
This is a plausible approach, but with one serious weakness. It is 
confronted directly by a consideration which one might call a value 
of the legal system, and in a sense it is a "value." But more realisti-
cally, it is only a practical necessity. This is economy of means in 
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the regulatory process. Solutions must be devised that do not make 
demands for extensive use of manpower, although it is unfortunate 
to be governed by this necessity. Although economy in government 
is a value no one should decry, the amount spent in the regulation 
of insurance is pitifully small in relation to the importance of the 
business. But as a practical matter, all insurance departments are 
terribly overburdened and, until that day when the sheep and the 
lion lie down together, will continue to be overburdened. Legis-
latures simply do not and will not supply enough funds for the 
departments to do the jobs well which are assigned to them. Con-
sequently, all proposed solutions to problems must face the econ-
omy test. Relative to the means probably available to the depart-
ment, will this remedy be reasonably effective? Tested by that 
standard, it is clear that the regulation of marketing practices will 
achieve far less to purify the market at much higher cost than the 
outright prohibition of certain provisions. Prohibition is adminis-
tered relatively surely and inexpensively in connection with the 
approval of policy forms. On the other hand, regulation of market-
ing practices would require an expensive enforcement program. 
Disclosure lies between them, with respect to ease of enforcement. 
Its value depends, however, on the understanding of the policy-
holder, and that would be substantially enhanced by disclosure only 
if terminology were made more nearly uniform in the insurance 
business. But that is quite another question that cannot be here 
pursued further. 
Life insurance performs a great service to the community. It 
is an essential prerequisite to the working of an industrial society; 
if it is not adequately provided by private enterprise, then un-
doubtedly government agencies will fill the gaps. Life insurance 
is especially important to the lower and middle classes of the pop-
ulation. In view of the complexity of the life insurance contract, 
these groups of people cannot understand it and need special pro-
tection; hence it is important to our society that reasonable efforts 
be made to ensure reasonable "purity of the market" in life insur-
ance. The regulator's task is not to prevent new developments that 
may prove to be of value to the public, but to prevent the use of 
mere gimmicks that do no more than complicate the policy and 
make it harder to understand, or make it more expensive. The bal-
ance among conflicting values is one difficult to maintain, but the 
effort must be made. Responsible and intelligent supervision of the 
insurance market is an important activity of government. It de-
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serves the best efforts of regulators and the best thinking of all 
those interested in it.202 
202 Several items have come to our attention too late to be incorporated into the 
text or regular body of footnotes. Related to the textual discussion of the cost of small, 
new companies are two cost studies: Business Men's Assurance Company of America, 
Young Company Expense Study, Reinsurance Bulletin, August 1962; and Life Insurance 
Company Cost Study, August 1963, compiled by the Life Insurance Company of Kentucky. 
The latter study concentrated on specialty policy companies. 
In an address by Harold Franklin at the Annual Seminar of Association for Advanced 
Life Underwriting, as reported in the National Underwriter, Life Ed., Dec. 29, 1962, p. 2, 
col. 2, he pointed out several factors tending to narrow the competitive advantage of a 
large over a small company. Small companies benefit from institutional advertising. Most 
persons purchase life insurance from the agent rather than from the company, thereby 
negating the advantage of an established name. Because of the improvement in mortality 
experience, a new company's experience should be better than that of the industry as a 
whole. A new company has an advantage in interest earnings since its investment port· 
folio does not include fixed dollar investments reflecting the low interest yields of the 
postwar period. 
Two recent coupon regulations have been promulgated. N.J. Dep't of Banking and 
Ins., Reg. No. I-1963A-l, July 15, 1963, among other things, prohibits the use of coupons, 
prohibits guaranteed annual endowments being contingent on payment of a premium due 
when the endowment would otherwise be payable, requires separate disclosure of the 
premium charged for the guaranteed annual endowment, etc. Reg. I-1963A-2 pro• 
hibits use of books resembling savings deposit books in banks in connection with policies 
containing guaranteed annual endowments. Mass. Dep't of Banking and Ins., Div. of Ins., 
Reg. Sept. 17, 1963, among other things, prohibits payment of guaranteed annual pure 
endowments contingent on payment of premium due when such benefit would otherwise 
be payable, and prohibits coupon policies. 
At a recent N.A.I.C. Zone IV meeting, Sept. 29-0ct. 1, 1963, Mr. James Douds an-
nounced that the NALU was conducting an independent study of specialty policies. Vve 
have not yet seen the results of that study. 
